Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein

Sabita Chakrabarti

Introduction
One of the central problems of philosophy is that of communication. Traditionally it is conceived that there must be something foundational by virtue of which communication becomes possible. Foundations are generally sought in a priori essences. Wittgenstein closely examines the problems and finds that the idea of communication certainly presupposes shared understanding but shared understanding must not be explained by assuming pregiven essences. The commonality which is a prerequisite for communication grows out of our participation in a common form of life.
Form of life plays a crucial role in the understanding of language. By virtue of the existence of Form of life we are able to communicate with others. Literally speaking ,form of life means a way of living , a pattern of life which is determined by context i. e . the actual situation in which one lives. If form of life is understood in the above sense our communication becomes questionable. So it is necessary to see what Wittgenstein means by the expressions and how he would explain communication. The present thesis is concerned with exploring what Wittgenstein exactly meant by the expression ‘form of life’and examining whether he could resolve the problem of communication by introducing this notion. The possibility of communication entirely depends on how we define form of life. Wittgenstein writes little but expresses much – this is specially true in the context of the use of the expression of form of life. He has used this expression only in five passages and philosophers interpret his cryptic uses variously . Our task in thesis is , therefore ,to see whether it plays a role at all and if so, how it influences our understanding of language. I do not agree with the view suggested by some philosophers that the notion hardly has any importance in Wittgensteinian thought. Nor do I agree with the sceptical interpretation that our communication is illusory. I think that by referring to the notion of form of life Wittgenstein does not deny the possibility of communication and he tries to do this with reference to the notion of form of life. When he is speaking of form of life he refers to a pattern of use. He simply stresses on the point that the pattern of use must not be determined by pregiven essences, the pattern must originate from our use, that is, form of life. The basis of language, therefore,is form of life and our communication is to be explained with reference to this notion. this is the position which I would like to support in the thesis.
It appears to me that form of life plays a keyrole in the understanding of language. But in order to establish the claim it is necessary to examine Wittgenstein’s remarks on this issue. I have examined all the textual references to form of life. My aim in the thesis is not to discover any implicit theory from Wittgenstein’s writings. I have just tried to elaborate his contentions. By discussing his notion of rule,grammar,understanding etc. ,I have tried to show how the notion of form of life he has given a new dimension to all these traditional concepts.
Wittgenstein adopts a new approach in philosophy. He looks at philosophical problems from the standpoint of’use’ and thinks that problems arise due to our misconception of language. Philosophical problems actually cannot be solved by accumulating new facts or by discovering new theories; they are to be resolved by seeing workings of our language.
In course of our discussion we have seen how concepts like rule,grammar ,criterion etc. Are rooted in a form of life. But his new strategy leaves a scope for multiple interpretations. The question is whether by introducing the notion of form of life he is upholding a kind of scepticism or conventionalism or realism. My aim in this thesis is not to undertake a detailed discussion of scepticism, conventionalism and realism. I have just tried to show where he is to be situated.
Our examination of Wittgenstein’s writings shows that form of life provides the conditions for ultimate justification which can not be questioned further. At the end of the thesis I have argued that though philosophers have provided arguments for the justification of it there is no need of giving further arguments to establish the existence of form of life.
The present thesis consists of four chapters viz. ,[i. ]Preliminer Remarks ;On form of life; [ii] A New Look at the central notions of language; [iii]Form of life; Some Alternative Interpretations and [i. v] Is There a form of Life
The aim of Chapter I is to extrapolate some characteristic features of form of life on the basis of textual evidence. In trying to do this it is necessary to survey why he has shifted to a different philosophical standpoint. A formal account of language was presented in the Tractatus where language was understood by logical rules. At later stages he realizes the difficulties of this approach . As aresult he shifts to another philosophical
Strategy, according to which language is to be understood by looking at its uses. The emphasis on the notion of use gives rise to the problem of how commonality of language is to be defined,unless language has something common communication cannot be explained. To resolve this problem he seems to introduce the notion of form of life.


We, therefore, have examined what he exactly said on this subject in this subject in section [ ii ]. An examination of these passages shows that the notion of form of life is used in various contexts, sometimes in the context of language – games,sometimes in the context of hope, sometimes in the context of mathematics. An explicit remark on form of life is found in On Certainty where he says that our belief in certain propositions cannot be justified by arguments further; justification of them consists in a form of life. We, thus find that ‘form of life’ plays a central role in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. But Thompkins challenges our way of understanding Wittgensteinian thought. According to him,Wittgenstein himself does not choose the expression’form of life’ as a translation of Lebensform. Therefore, We have no right to say that we are correct in understanding the expression. However, I do not agree with Thompkin’s suggestion. After answering Thompkin’s challenge,in the concluding section I have pointed out features of form of life ,viz. ,that it is a community property and that it is in a conventional. The use of the term conventional may appear confusing to someone. So,I have clarified the significance of the term in Wittgenstein’s philosophy i. e. ,by ‘ using’ convention he avoids absolute relativism on the one hand and essentialism on the other. I have argued in this connection that form of life is not an explanatory concept all explanations instead are intelligible in relation to a form of life.
I have established how all important notions of language are rooted in a form of life in the second chapter of the thesis. A detailed examination of rule, grammar,criterion
and understanding shows how Wittgenstein treats all these notion from the standpoint of use and use in turn is rooted in a form of life. Rules are there in language justifying our uses but in no way operate fromthe meta-level. Grammar provides rules for the application of language but it describes our usages by arranging what we have already known,Grammar must not try to discover rules whichlie beneath the language. Criterion also need not be understood in terms of a definition,it is to be understood with reference to its use which in turn is rooted in a form of life. Finally, understanding is traditionally defined as a kind of mental act. Wittgenstein argues against this position and says that one’s reaction to a situation is enough to determine whether or not one has understood; understanding is manifested in use. It is evident from the discussion that the basis of language is form of life;everything is rooted in it.
According to Wittgenstein,language rests on an agreement and the agreement consists in a form of life. Commentators try to understand the nature of agreement adopted in the Investigation and interpret form of life from different standpoints,some of these have been discussed in chapter III. According to Kripke,form of life is a notion which explains our agreement in language-use; the set of responses in which we agree and the way they are connected with our activities is form of life. So far as agreement prevails we respond in the same way. Wright does not agree with kripke’s

interpretation n and interprets form of life as acontract or aconvention.
Community constitutes a network of patterns in which the notion of correctness is intelligible. If communal verdict is challenged no objective standard remains by which Chapter of the thesis
CHAPTER-1
Preliminary Remarks: On form of life
Introduction
The notion of form of life has occupied a central position in wittgenstein’s later thought. But a persuasive interpretation regarding this notion has not yet been received so that one can appreciate the impact of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy on the notion of communication. My objective in the present thesis is to provide a clear exposition of what Wittgenstein exactly means by the expression ‘form of life’ and its implication for communication.
According to later Wittgenstein, for an understanding of language the focus on formal properties is not enough, one must look at the actual uses of language. After observing various contexts one grasps the pattern of use. The meaning of a sentence, therefore, cannot be grasped in isolation ,it has to be understood in agiven context. The context includes something which we share as social beings what Wittgenstein calls ‘form of life, i. e. , a specific context of use is embedded in a wider Icontext – it is embedded in the form of life. In the Investigations form of life is a key notion by virtue of which language communication is explained. In order to understand a language we need to know its syntax semantics phonetics. At a more subtle level we must know what is meant by the grammar of a language;knowing a grammar would include knowledge of what constitutes a rule , a criterion , a definition , a concept and so on. For Wittgenstein knowing a grammar would mean knowing all this in and through a form of life. He gives us the unique notion that a grammar is a form of life. To defend this claim an extensive study of his texts is required. In the first chapter I begin by making some preliminary remarks about form of life. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first deals with Wittgenstein’s shift from the Tractatus to the Investigations in respect of meaning – explanations . The earlier thesis begets a problem as to how language could be communicated by context independent rules alone. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein ensures perspicuity at the cost of real communicative content. By introducing the notion of form of life in the Investigations Wittgenstein has made room for uniform language rules as well as real life experiences. A detailed textual account of the form of life has been given in the second section of this chapter. Our concern in the present thesis is to demonstrate the cruciality of the notion of form of life. Recently E. F Thompkins has challenged the notion of form of life with the observation that philosophers have constructed arguments in relation to form of life without verifying whether the expression ‘form of life’ is a faithful translation of the original text, Philosophical Investigations. If Thompkin’s claim is justified all our efforts will be meaningless. So, in the third section I have responded to thompkin’s challenge by arguing that he has missed the significance of the expression as used in Wittgenstein’s later writings. In the concluding section I have outlined my understanding of the salient efeatures of form of life as found in the Investigations.
§– 1. The Period of Transition.
A survey of Wittgenstein’s Investigations shows that he has radically his view of meaning interpretation from his earlier view in the Ttractatus. Wittgenstein finds that language is multi-dimensional and conceptual clarity [as was sketched in the Tractatus] is not enough for determining meaning. He begins to re-think about what he has already established and as a result of this reconsideration of the established view he has shifted to a new notion of philosophising. Around about 1929 his thought moves in a new direction. He looks at language from a completely new perspective and brings about a radical change in the notion of philosophising. From the new standpoint philosophical problems cannot be solved by providing a theory, they are to be dissolved by looking at their actual uses.
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein thought that the workings of language is dependent on its underlying logical structure. In order to solve problems it is necessary to know the structure. In order to solve problems it is necessary to know the structure. He answered that if a question can be decided by logic it is possible to decide it without looking at the world for an answer1. Accepting the influence of logic [ two valued logic ] he tries to explain how language works. He thereby tries to reveal the nature of language and its relation to the world.
For Wittgenstein, language consists of propositions : these are compounds made up of elementary propositions which in turn are combinations names . The world, again consists of totality of facts. A fact is the existence of states of affairs. A ‘states of affairs’ is the combination of objects. Objects are the ultimate constituents of the world and are simple. A name means an object and the object is its meaning2. Wittgenstein holds that there is a picturing relation between language and the world i. e. names and objects. Names combine to form elementary propositions which correspond to states of affairs and each of these further constitute respectively propositions and facts [ for Wittgenstein propositions are also facts]. The picturing relation , therefore, consists of a relation between the elements of a picture and the things of the world. Pictures have in common with the world the same logical form. A picture describes reality by representing a possibility of existent and non-existent states of affairs. When the logical form of a proposition is not isomorphic with the form of reality then it is not a true representation. But there is no way of finding out from the proposition itself whether it is true or false. The proposition contains only the possibility of truth. To understand a proposition is to know what is the case if it is true. One can understand a proposition without knowing whether the propositionis is true. Wittgenstein ,thus ,develops a theory of meaning according to the rule of logic and the forms of an object. The meaning of a sentence , for him ,is composed out of the meaning of its constituents to describe the meaning of a sentence is to describe its truth conditions ,to provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for its application.
The theory of meaning sketched in the Tractatus involved an implicit commitment to metaphysical theories. On this theory, fully analysed names were conceived as standing for objects. They were simple entities and were their meanings. Objects ,therefore, were metaphysical simples; the substance of reality. The combinatorial possibilities of simple names of language reflect the metaphysical combinatorial possibilities of objects in reality. When W ittgenstein returned to philosophy in 1929 he rejected his old ways of thinking, he observed that the attempt to theory construction instead of solving philosophical problems produces fresh problems. He felt that the a priBori approach to language understanding was misguided, explanations of expressions by definitions replacing one by another are exhausted at a certain point. We reach at an arry of indefinables which are connected with the world in a peculiar mysterious way here we have to acknowledge the role of understanding which establishes a connection between language and reality ,understanding again,is defined ,on this view as akind of mental act.
Wittgenstein therefore, reorients his approach in Philosophical Investigations on the notion of meaning by bringing to the forefront the notion of use. Meaning does not consist in the correlation of words and things or in a picturing relation between propositions and facts. Meaning instead consists in uses. Understanding is manifested in the use that a speaker makes of an expression and in the explanations that he gives of what it means. Correct use of a word determines the meaning of it and using a word correctly is a criterion of understanding it. ’What speakers understand is completely expressed by the explanations they can give, there is no gulf to be filled between understanding and everyday explanations of words’3.
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein treated language as a calculus, a structured system of strictly defined rules. He assumed there that logic presents an order, the a priori order of the world. It is prior to all experience, no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can affect it. But Wittgenstein in the Investigations rejects the notion of a calculus and replaces it with that of a language game. The role of logic which plays apar it in determining the meaning of sentences was not a result of empirical investigation but a requirement to construct philosophical theory. According to him, the crystalline purity of logic must be removed . Language no longer has any formal unity which is to be discovered. There is only a family of structures which we understand by looking into the workings of language. His observation is manifested in the passage ‘The more narrowly we examine actual language the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. [For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement]. The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty’ [PI 107]. Functions of language are so varied that it is unnecessary to search for ‘the order’4. A sentence may be uttered to assert, to report or to command. To determine the meaning of a sentence we have to look at the contexts of utterance. Wittgenstein actually wants to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language. To do this we must not assume anything common we have to look and see instead whether there is anything common to language. On looking at language we see that there is no common essence, all we find is a complicated network of similarities and relationships among innumerable uses5. Wittgenstein compares language with the notion of a game and introduces the expression ‘language game’. There is no common element in what we call games, some are competitive, some are strictly rule-guided, some are purely for entertainment- all these are characteristics of games but do not form necessary and sufficient conditions. This feature of “game” is one which Wittgenstein believed it shared with “language”6’. The comparison of language to a game highlights the fact that speaking of a language involves both linguistic and non-linguistic activities. To understand the workings of language we have to understand its varity and to do this we will have to see how the expression is used in various language- games. The aim of Wittgenstein was to illuminate the connection of language with our life As Kenny says,’ the speaking of a language is part of a communal activity, a way of living in society which Wittgenstein calls a’ form of life’. It is through sharing in the playing of language-games that language is connected with our life ‘7
In the Tractatus language was seen as a calculus and in the Investigations language is seen as a corpus of use to be understood by the analogy of a game. When language is looked at as a language-game the Tractarion interpretation of language is no more and no less than a possible language-game -it looses its claim as a unique interpretation of language.
If recursiveness is a necessary feature of language ,it must be rule –governed but these rules emerge communally from practice, by playing various language language –games. To follow a rule is to practice it, not to interpret it ,practising must occur within a form of life.
Thus, we find that Wittgenstein was still looking for essence of language, not mysterious essence beneath the surface of language ‘but something that already lies open to view and becomes surveyable by rearrangement’8. Essences were now being searched in the guise of a living Lebensform. Such a search led Wittgenstein to remark ‘ It might be said in every case what is meant by “Thought” is the living element in the sentence, without which it is dead, a mere succession of sounds of series of written shapes’ [PG 65].
Form of life, therefore, plays a crucial role in the understanding of later wittgenstein’s philosophy. It is a notion by virtue of which regularity of language is explained In the following sections I shall discuss wittgenstein’s arguments on this subject; how form of life is fundamental to under standing of language and communication.
Section 2 . Textual References to Form of Life
Lebensform or Form of life is a novel expression first used by Wittgenstein. It can be found neither in everyday usage nor in any prior philosophical treatise. The notion of form of life has occupied a crucial position in Wittgenstein’s later thought though the actual expression ‘form of life’ has seldom been used by him. There are just five explicit references to ‘form of life’ in Wittgenstein’s entire Philosophical Investigations and only one passage in his On Certainty.
In the present section I shall try to find reasons for Wittgenstein’s relative silence on the issue of ‘form of life’. Further I shall try to expound thecentral role form of life has in the context of meaning-understanding in particular and communication in general. We shall start by examining textual occurances of ‘form of life’.

 
The following are the five explicit references made to form of life in the Investigations :
[i] It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle . . . And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life . [PI 19 ]
[ii] Here the term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity or of a form of life [PI 23]
[iii] “ So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false ?”-It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. [PI 241]
[iv] Can only those hope who can talk ? Only those who have mastered the use of a language. That is to say the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life. [PI 174]
[v] It is no doubt true that you could not calculate with certain sorts of paper and ink ,if, that is they were subject to certain queer changes- but still the fact that they changed could in turn only be got from memory and comparison with other means of calculation. And how are these tested in their turn? What has to be accepted, the given is- so one could say – forms of life. [PI p. 226]
The following are the references made to form of life in On Certainty :
Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. [OC 358]
But that means I want to conceive it as something beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal. [OC 359]
Apart from these explicit occurrence of the expression of form of life there are other passages in which the notion of form of life is alluded to. Such indirect references to the notion are scattered in various texts. The following are a few such example:
But how then does the teacher interpret the rule for the pupil ? [For he is certainly supposed to give it a particular interpretation ]- well, how but by means of words and training ? And if the pupil reacts to it thus and thus ,he possesses the rule inwardly.
But this is important, namely that this reaction,which is our guarantee of understanding, presupposes as a surrounding particular circumstances, particular forms of life and speech.
[As there is no such thing as facial expression without a face]. [This is an important movement of thought]. [RFM VII- 47]
Instead of the unanalysable ,specific ,indefinable : the fact that we act in such and such ways , e. g. ,punish certain actions, establish the state of affairs thus and so ,give orders, render accounts, describe colours ,take an interest in other’s feelings. What has to be accepted, the given –it might be said – are facts of living [ RPP –I- 630]
The above list of occurrences of the expression ‘form of life’ draws our attention to the point that the notion is used in various contexts; ;sometimes in the context of language-games, sometimes in the context of opinion; sometime in the context of ‘hope’. The problem confronting us is whether to treat these remarks as related to one central concept of form of life or several. Let us examine the passages one by one.
. . . to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [PI 19]
For later Wittgenstein, meaning is determined by practice, where context plays where context plays an important role . In Wittgenstein intends to say that in imagining a language we have to consider words, their rules of combination and all other things also such as agreements and understanding between the language user. ‘. . . to imagine a language the words are not enough, one needs to imagine something more than this : a form of life’ 9. Language cannot be described apart from describing circumstances . Since language is primarily a medium of communication a language cannot be understood outside the context of communication –the speaker and hearer’s background information, the purpose of speech and so on. ‘. . . a language may be described by describing the circumstances in which it is used and the actions with which the words are interwoven, it seems safe enough to conclude that either these actions and circumstances, or these together with the words with which they are interwoven [and probably the latter], are what a form of life is. ’10
Prof. Max Black also reads this passage in a similar fashion. He writes,’ “To imagine a language is to imagine a form of life “one way of taking this might be : “Don’t think that in imagining a language all you need to do is to consider words and their rules of combination :remember all the other things [such as agreements and understandings between the language-users ,for instance ] that enable sounds to be linguistic instruments that are used” 11.
To imagine a language is to imagine a form of life does not imply that form of life is a language or a language is a form of life. Language and form of life are not identical they are co-present and that is why one cannot be captured without the help of the other. We participate in a form of life by the very virtue of our existence . All our thoughts and actions are embedded in a form of life . We cannot master a language in abstraction and then choose whether or not to link it Garver rightly observes, “I cannot understand the words without seeing how it fits into the life of the speaker ,and I cannot do that without knowing what general form of life of the speaker has . ’12
Here the term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity , or of a form of life [PI 23]
Language is not an abstract phenomenon, it grows along with our living. Our living constitutes the meaning of sentences. So, a sentence gets its meaning in the stream of life. ‘Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings’ [OC 229] The emphasis on living situation does not deny the importance of a rule for the communication of language. Wittgenstein acknowledges that language must contain rules,and their importance remains the same for the understanding of language. His innovation is that rules are to be understood within a language-game, outside the game they are meaningless. Rules of a game do not exist over and above the game ,they are part of the game which is to be realised by playing the game. Similarly, we learn language through training but for this purpose we need not presuppose rules,external to our language. Rule originates from use and no rule exists independently of its application. Baker and Hacker express the point in the following passage:
‘A language is an aspect of human behaviour, it did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination. Speaking is acting, and uttering words and sentences is interwoven with human activities taking place within the world of which we are a part . A language in use is use is part of aform of life. 13
Frege criticised the view according to which arithmetic and language was a calculus. Whether language is a game or a calculus is not merely a matter of nomenclature. At times Wittgenstein has used the two expressions interchangeably ‘I can only describe language-games or calculuses. Whether they can still be called calculuses is indifferent, as long as we do not allow ourselves to be diverted by the use of a general term from the investigation of every individual case that we want to decide’14. What Wittgenstein objected to in the Fregian view of language was that “when Frege speaks of the thought a sentence expresses the word “thought” is more or less equivalent to the expression “sense of the sentence” [PG 65]. Wittgenstein was opposed to a formalised approach to language. For his sentence had no rigid sense –residing there in the sentence –to be discovered by any native speaker. Each and every interpretation of a sentence is a unique undertaking ,an investigation of a unique case. We do not make any assertions, say this or that is the real meaning of the sentence. The meaning of the sentence will not only vary with the context it may vary within the same context depending on the use it is put to. We can merely describe the use that is to say the game that is being played. This is not to trivialise language –when we describe a language we try to describe the function of a language in the life of the native speaker. Wittgenstein thinks that there is a definite connection between the native speaker’s language and her non-linguistic activities. This is what Wittgenstein refers to when he says there is a living element in every sentence, without which it is dead, a mere succession of sounds or series of written shapes 15.
Wittgenstein lays emphasis on the fact that the notion of a language-game is closely connected with the notion of a form of life . Inspite of admitting the rule guided nature of language Wittgenstein declares that ‘language-games ,like any other games will appear and change and disappear ’16. Since rule originates from use it is changeable but the changeable nature of rules does not hinder communication. At a certain stage ,one understands what the game is, whether an utterance is to be rendered as ‘playing the game’ . The identification of the game is possible because the game is identified within a form of life.
Thus form of life stands as a criterion in respect of which games get their significance . Rules of the game have no a priori essence ,these are construed on the basis of family resemblance ,leaving room ‘for the convergence on and divergence from a paradigm’17. To explain the nature of rules of the language game Wittgenstein takes the example of signposts, charts ,etc. And all these examples should be ‘thought of as an expression of a rule than as a rule itself ’18. One moves towards a signpost just because one follows the relevant rule i. e. , participation in a lived situation decides the meaning of following the rule . But the analogy of asignpost ‘could never be used as we used them if there were not a natural ,primitive ,uniform reaction that human beings display towards such things, given certain training’19. This primitive reaction cannot be regarded as an interpretation rather the reaction cannot be regarded as an interpretation rather the reaction is pre supposed by interpretation ‘ . . . Primitive reaction is not interpretation and the training which produces it is not explanation; rather ,the reaction is presupposed by any interpretation and explanation is only possible after training has been successful. ’20
Language is a game . The game is to be understood by playing the game. When one acquires mastery of a language one acquires mastery of rules i . e. ,one can play various games. This suggests that language-games are not settled by arbitrary conventions, they are instead rooted in a form of life . As kenny says ,’Wittgenstein is not saying that to obey a rule is to act in a way which others agree in calling obedient. But unless there was the primitive uniform reaction to certain training with certain paradigms, then the concept of rule ,and of agreement and disagreement with rule, could never get off the ground. ’20
The implications of this kind of interpretation are : [i ]the possibility of private practice is ruled out and [ii] language games are inseparably related with other aspects of life i . e. ,activities ,plans and purposes, passions and emotions, feelings and activities. Language cannot be considered in isolation, i . e ,not making references to any community. One might invent a language for oneself but that cannot be intelligible to others. So, Wittgenstein is not concerned with this type of language. Language rests on the notion of agreement, individual practice sanctioned by the community i. e. ,there must be a standard and recognised form of a game which an individual responds to. Wittgenstein stresses on the aspect of a shared form of life which is manifested in our successful communication .
The first [PI 19] and the second quotation [PI 23] [already mentioned above ] are used in the same sense. The first is a general remark on the nature of form of life that it is all-pervasive. Human action is embedded in a form of life. The second specifically says that form of life is an activity and cannot be captured in abstraction.
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false” ?- It is what human beings say that is true and false ,and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life [PI 241].
That we agree to use language in the way we do cannot be the result of a conformity of opinions, it is the result of an agreement in form of life. An agreement in opinion and an agreement in form of life are not the same. Though we do use ‘agreement’ in both contexts, it occurs in a much stronger sense in relation to form of life. By opinion is meant a provisional judgement not based on proof. An opinion is stronger than belief and weaker than proof. There is an element of probability in opinion and it also involves a degree of ad hocismOpinions change frequently and contrary opinions may be entertained simultaneously. If form of life is an agreement in opinion, meaning and understanding which is rooted in form of life would be unstable and vacillating. To understand a language we have to follow certain rules. Rules must contain a kind of rigidity because it is in respect of rules a sentence is judged to be correct or incorrect. Hence we are bound to follow a public criterion for the application of sentences. The agreement on which language rests is ‘not that of coming to or arriving at an agreement on a given occasion ,but of being in agreement throughout, being in harmony like pitches or tones or clocks or weighing scales or colums of figures. ’22
Wittgenstein is making us aware of a very important point in the passage PI 241. To participate in a form of life is no doubt an agreement ,this agreement is of a binding nature and should not be understood in idiosyncratic terms. There is a shared reality which forces us to conceive of meaning and understanding in a definite way. 23 Hence, form of life is stronger than opinion, it ensures stability in meaning and understanding. . This passage clarifies the nature of form of life . ’This passage and its surroundings context tells us nothing further about the relations between a form of life and the corresponding language . 24 Though a specific point is being elaborated it should not be treated as a completely separate point.
Can only those hope who can talk ?Only those who have mastered the use of a language. That is to say the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life . [PI p. 174]
The phenomena involved in hoping reveal aspects of a particular form of life . Whatever is stated in the above passage is exemplified in the given passage. He emphasises the point that even hope is impossible without participating in a form of life. One may be inclined to say that hope of anything is possible. One can hpope what one wishes to. But this is not so for Wittgenstein. Even an intentional state occurs in the context of form of life ,and is not exempt. So ,Wittgenstein’s remarks on hope are to be conceived as a derivational consequence of his basic position that form of life is all-pervasive . Our wildest hopes are directly or indirectly related to a form o f life . We share grief , joy ,and fear with other individuals because we share the same form of life .
It is no doubt that you could not calculate with certain sorts of paper and ink ,if , that is , they were subject to certain queer changes –but still the fact that they changed could in turn only be got from memory and comparison with other means of calculation . And how are those tested in their turn ?What has to be accepted ,the given is –so one could say –forms of life . [ PI p226]
The passage taken from the Appendix does not imptl anything new . We have already stated that in playing a language game ,in using a language form of life is presupposed . The same suggestion is implied in this passage . For Wittgenstein ,had no complete agreement been found in mathematics one could not learn the technique . But the agreement cannot be defined as an agreement in opinion . The two propositions ‘Human beings believe that twice two is four’ and ‘Twice two is four’ are used entirely in different senses . The former is constituted on the basis of opinion . According to Wittgenstein ,mathematics does not consist of individual opinion ,the agreement consists in the form of life . As Wittgenstein says ,
Do not look at the proof as a procedure that compels you ,but as one that guides you. And what it guides is your conception of a [particular] situation .
But how does it come about that it guides each one of us in such a way that we agree in the influence it has on us ? Well, how does it come about that we agree in counting ? “That is how we are trained” one may say ,” and the agreement produced in this way , is carried further by the proofs”.
By accepting a proposition as self-evident we also release it from all responsibility in the face of experience.
In the course of the proof our way of seeing is changed and it does not detract from this that it is connected with experience.
Our way of seeing is remodelled. ’ [RFM iv -30]
As Wittgenstein clearly says :-
Now I would like to regard this certainty ,not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life [OC 358]
But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified ,or unjustified,as it were ,as something animal [OC 359].
In these two passages taken from ON Certainty Wittgenstein intends to clarify the nature of certainty Later Wittgenstein was concerned with explaining various epistemological questions . One of them is the problem of certainty . He examines the problem and arrives at the conclusion that scepticism cannot be sustained. For Wittgenstein, doubt always needs a ground ,it must amount to something more than the verbal utterance of doubt. Doubt presupposes the mastery of a language-game: and doubt about the whole language cannot have a reasonable ground . Consequently, doubt presupposes certainty.
Wittgenstein holds that we have no reasonable ground to doubt the existence of the empirical world. No reasonable person suspects the existence of it ,on the contrary ,they believe in it Doubt arises only on specific grounds ,i .e. ,in a certain language-game .When I am in doubt about whether something is a ‘hand’ I must have a clear idea of what the word ‘hand’ means . So the expression of doubt presupposes a language –game .Wittgenstein ‘s attitude is expressed in the following passages :
That is to say , the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt ,are as it were like hinges on which those turn [OC 341]
That is to say ,it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are indeed not doubted .[OC 342] .

A reflection on the nature of language shows that empirical propositions and not propositions of logic constitute the foundation of our thoughts .Such propositions make up our world picture .We have not achieved the picture by satisfying ourselves of its correctness because we are satisfied with the world picture from the very beginning, i.e.,we have inherited a background against which truth or falsity of propositions are tested 25.One’s acceptance of this world picture rests not on having a proof of propositions but looking at the world from a certain perspective and taking the proposition to be true without asking any further question .
Our investigation makes it clear that Wittgenstein believes in the certainty of some propositions ,justifications of which can never be legitimately asked .We instinctively believe in the truth of such propositions which are described as something ‘animal’ and the certainty is guaranteed by the form of life .
So far we have seen that an entirely new dimension is introduced with the notion of use .Each concept of language is considered in respect of its use ;where context plays a dominant role .Apart from the context an expression possesses no meaning .Wittgenstein’s aim was to bring into focus the importance of contexts in each passage .We have seen how the context in turn is embedded within a form of life .Wittgenstein has repeatedly said that we cannot master a language in abstraction and then choose whether or not to link it with a form of life .All pervasiveness of the notion is exemplified when he applies the notion to the context of hope and mathematics . To make an utterance an agreement is necessary between the speaker and hearer ,but the agreement in question has not been explained to be agreement in opinion So ,we might reasonably claim that we attain certainty in using expressions .When we use an expression we use it in a certain form of life and we cannot think of the meaning of it in another way . The implication is that all of us share a common formof life .


SECTION- 3 A Challenge to the Notion of Form of Life

Thompkins ,in his article , ‘A Farewell to Forms of Life ‘ ,makes a bold attempt in disproving the entire corpus of Wittgenstenian translation in English He holds that though scholars have provided a number of arguments to demonstrate the importance of the notion , these observations do not agree with what Wittgenstein actually meant .According to Thompkins ,the English commentaries cannot grasp Wittgenstein’s intentions because the expression ‘form of life’ has neither been chosen nor used by Wittgenstein himself .So,it is unreasonable to build edifices of arguments on the untested foundation of a phrase not used in the Investigations He says ,’Form of Life’ has generated a considerable ad –hoc literature and innumerable incidental references but no agreement has been reached on what Wittgenstein means by it .26
Thompkin’s challenge is directed to the validity of the English translation made by Anscombe ,a well-known German scholar .Thompkins maintains that the expression ‘form of life’ is selected to represent the German expression Lebensform .Since Wittgenstein himself does not use the expression ,the possibility of error remains .Thompkins holds that the same game is not being played by the English expression ‘Form of Life’ and the corresponding German expression Lebensform .There is no conformity in meaning suggested by the two expressions either .The German expression clearly expresses its own meaning ,therefore,we have a clear idea of the rules of the Lebensform game .On the contrary , we are not clear enough about the game played with the expression ‘form of life’ .As Thompkins observes ,’It is not clear what game is being played in Philosophical Investigations with “form of life” . . .what is lacking is not unequivocal German but an English translation appropriate to Wittgenstein’s context’27.
For Wittgenstein ,the main purpose was to give a lucid account of our use of words .For this reason Wittgenstein examins everyday language and finds that to know the meaning of an expression is to know its use, his aim is ‘to reduce words from their metaphysical to their everyday use’ 28. Thompkins comments that the problem of form of life arises when language does not work .He says, ‘The problem of “form of life”is intrinsically non –Wittgensteinian in its persistent obscurity and tendency to generate reams of explanation .Its origins are grammatical ,not philosophical; translating signs instead of symbols: ‘ ‘Form’=’form’ ;’Lebens’ (generative case of ‘Leben’= of life’ ;) ‘Lebensform’= form of life ’29 .He regards that the notion of form refers to something non-linguistic but there is nothing to which the label of form is to be attached. The problem of form of life ,therefore ,is to be characterised as a problem in its own right .This is generated by the inappropriate use of the word ‘Form ‘ .
For Thompkins ,an extensive discussion on ‘Form’ is to be derived from the Tractatus .The hints given in the Tractatus might help us to know the referent of ‘form of life’. In the Tractatus the correspondence between ‘Form’ and form is established through the logical projection and we have to postulate the ontological world .
What any picture ,of whatever form ,must have in common with reality ,in order to
be able to depict it –correctly or incorrectly –in any way at all ,is logical form ,i . e.,
the form of reality .[TLP 2 .18]

In order to be able to represent logical form ,we should have to be able to station
Ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic ,that is to say ,outside the
World .[TLP 4 .12]

This sort of analysis could neither be applied in Leben/life nor in Form/form and form of life could not be conceived as a means for solving ontological puzzles .Thompkins goes on to argue; ‘clearly neither Leben/life nor Form/form meets this criterion and it is no use looking for an object which would establish the common identity of either pair .Nor is it any use attempting to analyse the concept of ‘form of life’ as a means of solving ontological puzzles’ 30.We have no means of verifying whether the correlation holds between Form & form and Lebens and of life .From the standpoint of use all metaphysical considerations are meaningless .
The inclination of Wittgenstein was not at all to provide any metaphysical theory, meaning should not be sought beyond language the language itself is the vehicle for thought ,meaning is determined by social convention ‘To search in the world for some objective referent for “form of life” directly contradicts his later teaching .31 Hence ,form of life should not be conceived as something which corresponds to anything objective The meaning of a word consists in its use not in the object which it names .’The way out of the ontological impass is therefore to retrace Wittgenstein’s steps ;forget about a referent [ for ‘Lebensform’ no less than for ‘form of life’] and seek out how he uses the word ‘Lebensform’. . . how the word is used by speakers of German in general might give some inking of how he uses it .32 So ,according to thompkins , the problem about the form of life arises on account of an inappropriate translation of the expression ‘Lebensform’ and also due to a wrong association with the Tractarian form .
Thompkins’ way of reasoning might nullify our entire understanding of the works of Wittgenstein .If his insight is justified most of the Wittgenstinian literature will loose its significance .Thompkins’ line of reasoning is striking in the sense that he makes us aware of the need to verify the origin or root of every word . If the origin remains unverified all consequent philosophical investigations will be futile .
There is no doubt that thompkins has drawn our attention to the most fundamental point of any philosophical investigation by asking us to re-examine the original text .A careful examination of the text might alter our whole progr mme ,on the other hand ,it might establish our thesis more convincingly .
I confess that I do not have direct access to the German texts .To develop my thesis I have depended on the translation done by the well-known German scholar ,Anscombe .She is competent both in German &English .So,we might rely on her translation. Moreover ,most of the contemporary scholars have relied on the English translation and have made efforts to clarify Wittgenstein’s position accordingly .The authenticity of the English translation has not been challenged prior to thompkins .For this reason ,I have followed the line along which these scholars have gone .If Thompkins’ claim is acknowledged by the Wittgensteinian scholars then of course ,I may have to revise my conclusions .
In the present thesis ,we will not accept Thompkins’ strategy for the understanding of Wittgenstein’s later thought .I would like to argue for the importance and pervasiveness of form of life: Our use gets its significance in respect of a form of life.To understand the meaning of an expression we have to take notice of the game within which the expression is uttered .Thompkin’s way of understanding the expression ‘Lebensform’ does not contradict our way of interpreting form of life.We have also laid stress on the following two points :(i)Wittgenstein upholds a theory of meaning where use and context are the determinants of the meaning of an expression and(ii) meaning is determined not in respect of abstract rules but in respect of use .The pattern of usage is reflected in a rule which ,in turn, reflects a form of life .Thompkins also suggests ‘The meaning of the words on which for example our judgement of colours depends is a matter of communal consensus; of the way people live their lives not of transcendental truths enshrined in language.33Thus we feel that in essence Thompkins is not saying anything very different from us .
Our concern in the present thesis is not to prove that by the expression ‘form of life’Wittgenstein meant something a priori,the existence of which is to be proved at the metaphysical level .Thompkin’s allegation is that we are confusing the use of the expression ‘Form’ as it is used in the context of the Investigations.with its use in the Tractatus .We all know that Wittgenstein explicitly rejected the Tractarian way of solving problems in the Preface of Investigations so why should we ascribe the Tractarian way of analysis to the new approach adopted in the later works ?Throughout this thesis our aim has been to explore how people’s living and thinking influence language .Thompkins cannot understand the thrust of the Investigations .Mere use of the expression ‘Form’ does not lead us to postulate a metaphysical entity .The expression ‘form’ should not be considered in isolation ,we have to under stand the expression within the context of the whole spirit of the Investigations .Here we might remember the suggestion of Wittgenstein himself that an expression must be considered within a context .

Section .-4 Features of Form of Life

Wittgenstein ,as our discussion suggests ,upholds a fundamental notion by which our language is regulated ,viz. ,all linguistic transactions occur within a form of life .One of the central problems of the Investigations is to explain how communication takes place.We communicate our thoughts and experiences with others .Unless our language contains certain common patterns of our thought and experience ,sharable by those with whom we communicate ,communication would not be possible .Wittgenstein accounts for this sharability through language by introducing the notion of formof life .All members participating in the same form of life belong to the same speech community and are capable of communicating with one another .

Patterns of activity and response – following rules in the ways that we do ,
Coping with past ,hoping for the future ,caring for and educating the young
Taking into account the interests and feelings of others – patterns so obvious
As to escape notice are constitutive of human life .34

Patterns are obvious in all these sorts of uses but identity conditions of the pattern cannot be provided .At the most it is to be under stood in terms of family resemblance .Hence ,we might notice two features of form of life .[i]it is a community property and [ii]it is in a certain sense conventional
Language presupposes agreement and the agreement must take place within a given community .The meaning of a sentence is in no way a result of idiosyncratic meaning ascription ,in order to ascribe a meaning to a sentence an individual must take recourse to community assent ,community provides conditions under which we are justified in ascribing a meaning to a sentence .
Secondly ,form of life is in a sense conventional .We use language and continue to use language .We can do this because we belong to a common form of life and find it natural to behave in a particular way .35
Form of life is to be distinguished from empirical regularities .Empirical regularities are a result of induction ,hypothesis and experiment but form of life is not discoverable in the same way .Scientific investigation itself presupposes the forms of life to formulate a hypothesis .So , form of life cannot be used as a theoretical or explanatory concept .We are situated in a form of life Form of life moulds our very way of thinking .Nobody can go beyond form of life to conceive it in other ways whereas empirical regularities may be conceived differently from what they actually are .36
Wittgenstein denies the possibilities of private practice ,he lays stress on the public nature of language founded on community assent .There is a constraint on practice .This constraint is imposed by our form of life But the constraint is not identical with the force of laws of nature .We are not bound by forms of life as we are bound by laws of nature .Nature behaves in a definite way if such and such conditions occur .Natural events like storm or an earthquake follow But human beings on the whole do not respond in absolutely predictable ways To illuminate this feature of form of life the term ‘conventional ‘is used .By calling form of life a convention we would like to follow Cavell’s way of understanding ‘convention’ .Cavell writes ,
‘We are thinking of convention not as the arrangements a particular culture
has found convenient ,in terms of its history and geography ,for effecting the necessities of human existence ,but as those forms of life which are normal to any group of creatures we call human ,any group about which we will say ,for example ,that they have a part to which they respond ,or a geographical environment which they manipulate or exploit in certain ways for certain humanly comprehensible motives .Here the array of ‘conventions’ are not patterns of life which they differentiate human beings from one another ,but those exigencies of conduct and feeling which allhumans share ‘.37

To say form of life is conventional is to hold thatwith the change of history and according to the practical needs of human beings ,their uses of ‘grammar’,and language change .Wittgenstein’s contribution to the problem of communication is that he sees the problem and the solution of the problem from the standpoint of use .In order to communicate something we need not take recourse to abstract meaning entities or to some inferred ‘language using mind ‘ ,Wittgenstein rejected the Augustinian explanation of meaning where in order to understand a word one had to understand the bond between the word and what it signified .According to the Augustinian notion understanding what a speaker is communicating would finally boil down to understanding the relation between the expression and reality .As if this relation between the expression and reality were mysteriously apprehended by the speaker,and the hearer was expected to understand this mental act of relating expressions with reality .By the introduction of form of life Wittgenstein tried to banish the dependence of communication on the understanding of such mysterious relations ,e.g .,the relation between an expression and what it signifies and the relation between mind on the one hand and language and reality on the other .
Wittgenstein no longer treats meaning –understanding as a matter of inference where the hearer tries to grasp the mysterious relations between an expression and the signified as perceived by the speaker. Under such circumstances whether the communication has clicked or not would remain highly probable .Wittgenstein in his Investigations overcomes this scepticism by saying that the meaning of an expression is its use .Wittgenstein sometimes says that the meaning of a word is its use in a language .Sometimes he says that it is its use in a calculus or in a language –game .These uses ,however ,are neither unconstrained nor arbitrary There are two constraints on language use One is the formal constraint of form of life .The practice of every language use can be checked and examined by other members of the same language community .The constraint on language use is a material constraint induced by the conventional nature of forms of life .38



NOTES


1 .See Tractatus 5.551
2 .SeeTractatus 3.203
3 .Scepticism ,Rules and Language , G.P .Baker &P .M .S . Hacker ,Basil Blackwell ,Oxford 1985 ,pp117 -18 .
4 .See PI 132 .
5 .See PI 66 .
6 .Wittgenstein ,Kenny ,Anthony ,Penguin Books Ltd . ,Harmondsworth ,1986 ,p 163 .
7 .Op .cit .p 163 .
8 .Op .cit p 223 .
9 .’ “Forms of Life “ in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations’ J .F .M .Hunter in Essays on Wittgenstein ,( ed .)E .D .Klemke ,University of Illinois Press , Urbana ,1971 ,p286 .
10 .op .cit .p 286
11 .’ “Lebensform “and “Sprachsphiel “ in Wittgenstein’s later works ‘,Max Black ,in Wittgenstein and his Impact on contemporary thought : Proceedings of the Second International Wittgenstein Symposium ;29th August to 4th September ,1977 ,Kirchberg (Austria) eds .Elisbeth Leinfellner ,Werner Leinfellner ,Hall Berghal ,Adolf Hubner ,Vienna ,1978 ,Holder –Piehler –Tempsky .p326 .
12 .’Form of Life in W ittgenstein’s later Work ‘,Newton Garver in Dialectica Vol .44 ,1990 ,p 183 .
13 .Scepticism ,Rules and Language ,G .P . Baker & P . M .S .Hacker ,Basil Blackwell ,Oxford ,1985 ,p 133 .
14 .Wittgenstein ,Anthony Kenny ,Penguin Books Ltd .,Harmondsworth ,1986 ,p 162 .
15 .See PG 65 .
16 .’ “Forms of Life “in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations ‘J .F . M Hunter ,op .cit . ,p .275 .
17 .Wittgenstein ,Anthony Kenny ,op .cit .p .224 .
18 .op .cit .p .172
19 .op . cit .p .173 .
20 .op .cit p .173
21 .op .cit .p .174 .
22 .The Claim of Reason :Wittgenstein ,Scepticism ,Morality and Tragedy ,Stanley Cavell ,in The Clarendon press ,Oxford ,1979 ,p .32 .
23 .See “Lebensform and Sprachsphiel in Wittgenstein’s later works ,”Max Black ,op .cit .p .326 .
24 .op .cit .p .326 .
25 .See ON Certainty ,p 94 .
26 .’A Farewell to Forms of Life ‘,E .F .Thompkins ,in Philosophy ,April ,Vol .65 ,No .256
27 .op cit .p 181 .
28 .See PI ,116 .
29 .op .cit p 183 .
30 .op cit .p .185
31 .op .cit .p188-89
32 .op .cit .p 186 .
33 .op .cit .p 190 .
34 .’The Very Idea of a Form of Life ‘’Lynne rudder Baker in Inquiry vol .27 ,July 1984 .p 277.
35 .By using the term ‘convention ‘I do not intend to stress theidea of a ‘contract ‘ as the basis of form of life .I am concerned with distinguishing form of life from natural laws .Natural laws are forced on us and our behaviour must accord with laws in a definite way .But in the case of form of life we are not bound in the same way .The very existence implies that we will be guided by it ,but with the change of history our responses may change .So we might call form of life a natural convention .However ,forms of life do not indicate that they have the arbitrariness of unconstrained choice nor do they have the force of the laws of nature .No logical contradictions follow if practices are different from what they are . The point is that such alternative practices would not be real options for us .
36 .See ‘The Very Idea of a Form of Life ‘,Lyenne Rudder Baker ,op .cit .
37 .The Claim of Reason :Wittgenstein scepticism Morality and Tragedy ,Stanley Cavell ,The Clarendon Press Oxford ,1979 ,p .111 .
38 .See ,’The Very Idea of a Form of Life ‘, Lenney Rudder Baker ,op .cit .p .279-80 .


 
Chapter -II
A New Look At the Central Notions of Language .

Introduction

We have noticed in the earlier chapter that the notion of ‘form of life’ has occupied a central place in Wittgenstein’s philosophy .By introducing the notion Wittgenstein lays stress on the impact of history on language .So ,a great change is found in the treatment of all linguistic concepts .Our concern in this chapter is to give a brief account of how the notions of rule , grammar ,criterion and understanding are treated from the new perspective and how they are central to language communication .Traditionally these notions have been defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions e .g .traditionally one speakes of the necessary and sufficient condition of rule ,grammar .such definitions in turn ,have contributed to the regimentation of language making language more like calculus and regimenting the open texture of language to a great extent .We owe it to later Wittgenstein for an alternative way of looking at language .Wittgenstein acknowledges the importance of notions of grammar rule ,criterion and understanding in language communication .But in his hands these notions gain an entirely new treatment .They are no longer seen as rigidly definable concepts but gain a much more flexible character .They are now seen as being responsive to the context of their application .By looking at how they are used we can grasp what is meant by grammar ,rule ,criterion ,and understanding .The context of use ,however ,is not arbitrary nor is it in a perpetual flux .Our use of language in general and our use of notions like grammar ,rule ,etc .in particular are reflections of a form of life in which we participate .





CHAPTER-1
Preliminary Remarks: On form of life
Introduction
The notion of form of life has occupied a central position in
wittgenstein’s later thought.But a persuasive interpretation regarding
this notion has not yet been received so that one can appreciate the
impact of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy on the notion of
communication.My objective in the present thesis is to provide a clear
exposition of what Wittgenstein exactly means by the expression ‘form
of life’ and its implication for communication.
According to later Wittgenstein, for an
understanding of language the focus on formal properties is not
enough, one must look at the actual uses of language.After observing
various contexts one grasps the pattern of use.The meaning of a
sentence, therefore, cannot be grasped in isolation ,it has to be
understood in agiven context.The context includes something which we
share as social beings what Wittgenstein calls ‘form of life, i.e., a
specific context of use is embedded in a wider Icontext – it is
embedded in the form of life.In the Investigations form of life is a
key notion by virtue of which language communication is explained. In
order to understand a language we need to know its syntax semantics
phonetics.At a more subtle level we must know what is meant by the
grammar of a language;knowing a grammar would include knowledge of
what constitutes a rule , a criterion , a definition , a concept and
so on. For Wittgenstein knowing a grammar would mean knowing all this
in and through a form of life. He gives us the unique notion that a
grammar is a form of life. To defend this claim an extensive study of
his texts is required. In the first chapter I begin by making some
preliminary remarks about form of life. The chapter is divided into
four sections.The first deals with Wittgenstein’s shift from the
Tractatus to the Investigations in respect of meaning – explanations .
The earlier thesis begets a problem as to how language could be
communicated by context independent rules alone.In the Tractatus
Wittgenstein ensures perspicuity at the cost of real communicative
content. By introducing the notion of form of life in the
Investigations Wittgenstein has made room for uniform language rules
as well as real life experiences.A detailed textual account of the
form of life has been given in the second section of this chapter.Our
concern in the present thesis is to demonstrate the cruciality of the
notion of form of life.Recently E.F Thompkins has challenged the
notion of form of life with the observation that philosophers have
constructed arguments in relation to form of life without verifying
whether the expression ‘form of life’ is a faithful translation of the
original text, Philosophical Investigations.If Thompkin’s claim is
justified all our efforts will be meaningless. So, in the third
section I have responded to thompkin’s challenge by arguing that he
has missed the significance of the expression as used in
Wittgenstein’s later writings. In the concluding section I have
outlined my understanding of the salient efeatures of form of life as
found in the Investigations.
§– 1. The Period of Transition.
A survey of Wittgenstein’s Investigations shows that he has radically
his view of meaning interpretation from his earlier view in the
Ttractatus. Wittgenstein finds that language is multi-dimensional and
conceptual clarity [as was sketched in the Tractatus] is not enough
for determining meaning. He begins to re-think about what he has
already established and as a result of this reconsideration of the
established view he has shifted to a new notion of philosophising.
Around about 1929 his thought moves in a new direction.He looks at
language from a completely new perspective and brings about a radical
change in the notion of philosophising.From the new standpoint
philosophical problems cannot be solved by providing a theory, they
are to be dissolved by looking at their actual uses.
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein thought
that the workings of language is dependent on its underlying logical
structure. In order to solve problems it is necessary to know the
structure. In order to solve problems it is necessary to know the
structure. He answered that if a question can be decided by logic it
is possible to decide it without looking at the world for an
answer1.Accepting the influence of logic [ two valued logic ] he tries
to explain how language works. He thereby tries to reveal the nature
of language and its relation to the world.
For Wittgenstein, language consists of
propositions : these are compounds made up of elementary propositions
which in turn are combinations names . The world, again , consists of
totality of facts. A fact is the existence of states of affairs. A
‘states of affairs’ is the combination of objects. Objects are the
ultimate constituents of the world and are simple. A name means an
object and the objectis its meaning2. Wittgenstein holds that there is
a picturing relation between language and the world i.e. names and
objects. Names combine to form elementary propositions which
correspond to states of affairs and each of these further constitute
respectively propositions and facts [ for Wittgenstein propositions
are also facts]. The picturing relation , therefore, consists of a
relation between the elements of a picture and the things of the
world. Pictures have in common with the world the same logical form. A
picture describes reality by representing a possibility of existent
and non-existent states of affairs. When the logical form of a
proposition is not isomorphic with the form of reality then it is not
a true representation. But there is no way of finding out from the
proposition itself whether it is true or false. The proposition
contains only the possibility of truth. To understand a proposition is
to know what is the case if it is true. One can understand a
proposition without knowing whether the propositionis is true.
Wittgenstein ,thus ,develops a theory of meaning according to the rule
of logic and the forms of an object. The meaning of a sentence , for
him ,is composed out of the meaning of its constituents to describe
the meaning of a sentence is to describe its truth conditions ,to
provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for its
application.
The theory of meaning sketched in the
Tractatus involved an implicit commitment to metaphysical theories. On
this theory, fully analysed names were conceived as standing for
objects. They were simple entities and were their meanings.
Objects ,therefore, were metaphysical simples; the substance of
reality. The combinatorial possibilities of simple names of language
reflect the metaphysical combinatorial possibilities of objects in
reality. When W ittgenstein returned to philosophy in 1929 he rejected
his old ways of thinking, he observed that the attempt to theory
construction instead of solving philosophical problems produces fresh
problems. He felt that the a priBori approach to language
understanding was misguided, explanations of expressions by
definitions replacing one by another are exhausted at a certain point.
We reach at an arry of indefinables which are connected with the world
in a peculiar mysterious way here we have to acknowledge the role of
understanding which establishes a connection between language and
reality ,understanding again,is defined ,on this view as akind of
mental act.
Wittgenstein therefore, reorients his approach
in Philosophical Investigations on the notion of meaning by bringing
to the forefront the notion of use. Meaning does not consist in the
correlation of words and things or in a picturing relation between
propositions and facts. Meaning instead consists in uses.
Understanding is manifested in the use that a speaker makes of an
expression and in the explanations that he gives of what it means.
Correct use of a word determines the meaning of it and using a word
correctly is a criterion of understanding it.’What speakers understand
is completely expressed by the explanations they can give, there is no
gulf to be filled between understanding and everyday explanations of
words’3.
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein treated language as
a calculus, a structured system of strictly defined rules. He assumed
there that logic presents an order, the a priori order of the world.
It is prior to all experience, no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty
can affect it. But Wittgenstein in the Investigations rejects the
notion of a calculus and replaces it with that of a language game. The
role of logic which plays apar it in determining the meaning of
sentences was not a result of empirical investigation but a
requirement to construct philosophical theory. According to him, the
crystalline purity of logic must be removed .Language no longer has
any formal unity which is to be discovered. There is only a family of
structures which we understand by looking into the workings of
language. His observation is manifested in the passage ‘The more
narrowly we examine actual language the sharper becomes the conflict
between it and our requirement. [For the crystalline purity of logic
was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement].
The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of
becoming empty’ [PI 107].Functions of language are so varied that it
is unnecessary to search for ‘the order’4. A sentence may be uttered
to assert, to report or to command. To determine the meaning of a
sentence we have to look at the contexts of utterance. Wittgenstein
actually wants to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of
language. To do

Section- 4
An enquiry into the notion of understanding is a part of the enquiry into
the conditions of successful communication of language . Understanding is
generally described in terms of psychological states. Going against the
traditional explanation of understanding Wittgenstein argued to show that
understanding is to be explained with reference to use alone .Understanding
is manifested in the use of word.
By introducing the notion of use Wittgenstein has brought
about a radical change in the way of philosophizing . From the new
standpoint he analyses the concept of understanding and says that
understanding a word means how to use it ; understanding is directly
associated with the notion of use and it is recognised and measured by
outward criteria .Understanding is not something private to the inner life
of an individual , it is something recognised by hearers by virtue of
participating in a form of life.
Traditional philosophers e.g .Frege ,Russell and
Wittgenstein (in the Tractatus ) assume that the workings of language
involve mental processes without which language cannot function.They
maintain that the functions of language consists of two parts,viz.,the
inorganic part which involves handling of signs and the organic part which
is concerned with understanding these signs .The inorganic part performs its
function within the mechanism of the mind .signs are arbitrary and
conventional .Understanding gives them meaning .By themselves signs are
inert and dead ,language becomes alive by being meant by speakers and
understood by hearers.Thus signs of language are dead without accompaniment
of the notion of understanding .A sentence may be uttered without
understanding the sign and nothing is missing with respect to the sign ,what
is absent is the understanding ,which is accompanied with the sign .They
argue to show that the understanding takes place in a mysterious medium
called mind .
We have repeatedly said that Wittgenstein in the
Investigations abandoned all kinds of mystical ,psychological and
metaphysical interpretations of concepts .Accordingly ,the explanation of
understanding as a psychological state is also rejected .It is instead
explained with reference to use alone .During his early period Wittgenstein
had given a detailed account of the traditional exposition of understanding
which is sketched in the Blue and Brown Book .There Wittgenstein writes :
‘It seems that there are certain definite mental processes
bound up with the working of language ,processes through which alone
language can function . . .The signs of language seem dead without these
mental processes ; . . .if you are asked what is the relation between a name
and the thing it names ,you will be inclined to answer that the relation is
a psychological one . . . we are tempted to think that the action of
language consists of two parts ; an inorganic part ,the handling of signs
and an organic part which we may call understanding these signs . . .These
latter activities seem to take place in a queer kind of medium ,the mind ‘
(B&B,p 3) .
The passage describes understanding as a mental phenomenon
.This inclination is strengthened by further reflections .Firstly ,one
cannot observe the understanding of another though one can easily observe
behaviour which manifests understanding .Understanding is a prerequisite of
behaviour because one can understand without behavioural manifestation .So,
understanding is separate from behaviour. We are ,in fact, sometimes
inclined to think that the speaker knows what he understands and hearer’s
access to the speaker’s understanding is only through inductive or
analogical inference .
Secondly, we speak of a sudden flash of understanding and
assume the existence of mind to describe this distinctive experience .One
may exclaim suddenly that the series of 1 ,5 ,11 ,19 ,29 is given by a
formula an =n2 + n -1 ,because one has understood the formula and knows the
future application for the sequence of numbers .32 So ,when one speaks of a
sudden flash of understanding the formula ,by using the expression ‘Now I
understand ‘,it might appear to someone that the utterance is the reflection
of mental phenomena .
Thirdly ,there is an experiential difference between
understanding and not understanding something that is temporally extended
,e.g., understanding of a lecture or a piece of music .We are familiar with
so many cases that one is listening to a lecture without understanding the
content of the lecture .So different kinds of experiences are involved when
one listens to a lecture comprehending the content of the lecture or when
one merely hears the lecture .Thus ,these considerations also suggest that
understanding is a kind of mental phenomenon .
So, philosophers have reasons to describe understanding as a
mental phenomenon i.e. the word ‘understand’ stands for a mental reaction
accompanying hearing or speaking of a sentence and they are tempted to
describe it as experience ,states or processes .To avoid the clouds of
mystery associated with the traditional picture of the notion later
Wittgenstein re-examines the concept and the way we use it .He subsequently
tries to explain the term ‘understand’ as it is used in everyday discourse .
According to Wittgenstein , though there is such a thing
like experience of a sudden understanding it cannot be described as
experience .The description of experience cannot provide the essence of
understanding when one suddenly understands an event many things may happen
.One may have certain mental images experience a certain feeling of tension
,e.g. his face may light up ,his rhythm of breathing may change .In spite of
the presence of these experience and subtle behavioural changes one may not
understand ;on the other hand ,one may understand without having any of
these experiences .So ,such experiences are neither necessary nor sufficient
for understanding .
For Wittgenstein ,the crux of understanding consists in the
correct application of words ;how a word is used is an indication of how it
is understood .The experiences involved with understanding are none of our
concern .Within a certain circumstance one understands how to use an
expression correctly and making his avowal in such circumstances is the
criterion of his understanding .33
If understanding cannot be described as experience neither
can it be stated as activities or processes in the mind .According to some
philosophers understanding is a kind of mental process which occurs while
one is hearing a sentence .Wittgenstein’s criticism to this view is that
‘the criteria by which we decide whether someone understands a sentence and
what the speaker meant by it are different from the criteria by which we
discover what mental processes are going on while someone is talking or
writing ‘34
The notion of mental process itself needs elucidation .One
may mean by mental process something analogous to an experience. The
experience is private to a person and accessible through introspection .So
,if we say understanding is a mental process ,to know the understanding of
the speaker we have to depend on his experience- what he reports after
introspection .
The idea of inner accessibility gives rise to multiple
confusions .Sometimes we mistakenly think that we have understood something
,so ,the object of introspection must be singularly elusive .Secondly ,if
understanding is accessible to introspection we face the problem of how to
capture the specific quality of mental experience which understanding
apparently involves .The experience associated with understanding is diverse
and varies from occasion to occasion. So ,to capture the common essence is
impossible.
Confronted with these criticisms some thinkers hold that
understanding is to be regarded as something mental denying its
introspectable characteristics .35 They argue that by understanding one may
mean an event in a hypothetical mechanism .Understanding is a hypothesis
postulated to explain the observable behaviour of human beings .It is
possible for us to misconstrue what we understand which is manifested in
future linguistic behaviour .Now ,if future behaviour disproves
understanding then surely current behaviour can probablify the assertion
that one understands an expression. Thus ,according to these thinkers
assertion of understanding is a hypothesis about a mental phenomenon.
Traditionally, understanding is defined as a kind of mental
process .Wittgenstein says ,’Try not to think of understanding as a’ mental
process’ at all –For that is the expression which confuses you ‘[ PI. 154]
.We can ask a person ,who considers understanding to be a mental process
various question : ‘When do you understands a sentence ?’ ‘Is understanding
an articulated process like the utterance of a sentence or is it an
unarticulated process ,accompanying a sentence ?’Though one may give answers
to all these questions by assuming understanding as a mental process ,that
is to say , I understand a sentence when a mental process occurs to my mind
. It is an inner mental process ;an image appears to my mind and I
articulate a sentence ;understanding is reflected in the utterance of the
sentence .Understanding may be an inarticulated process also because I can
make a sub-vocal speech .These sorts of answers ,according to Wittgenstein
are not answers at all because such answers give rise to many absurd
questions which ultimately make it clear that understanding is not a process
at all .In other words ,mentalistic interpretation of understanding gives
rise to all the metaphysical questions which do not seem plausible to
Wittgenstein .
Nevertheless ,one may be tempted to say that understanding
is to be described as a state rather than a process .Wittgenstein argues
that even calling understanding a state is misleading .We do have notions of
psychological states but understanding cannot be identified with such states
.We often speak of being in a state of intense excitement ,deep depression
,etc.,but not of being in a state of hating or loving and so on .A mental
state can last without a break or be interrupted .Certainly understanding can
be interrupted though not in the same way as we speak of mental states .When
one says ,’He has been in continuous pain since yesterday ,he makes a
perfectly intelligible statement but the sentence ‘he has understood the
word continuously since yesterday morning ‘does not make any sense .’36 Our
grammar excludes the possibility of making such a sentence .
Wittgenstein , therefore ,concludes that understanding need
not be associated with experience [PI. 153] or mental processes [PI. 152
,154 ]or a mental state [PI. P.59(a) ].The traditional view of understanding
arises out of confusions .In order to remove confusions Wittgenstein
investigates into how we use and explain the term ‘understand’.The upshot of
his investigation is that understanding is to be known through correct
application.37 Using a word correctly is a criterion of understanding it
.This shows that though Wittgenstein criticizes the traditional account of
understanding the notion of understanding has not been rejected . According
to him ,the difference between sentences can be known by pointing to the
differences in the practice of using sentences viz. ,in the circumstances in
which the expressions of understanding are uttered .Understanding is
manifested in use ,one can produce a sentence which is appropriate to a
context and can react in a way appropriate to that context .One’s reaction
manifests whether or not and how one understands the utterance .Hence,
correct application of an expression is to be considered as the criterion of
understanding .
Understanding is described by Wittgenstein as the mastery of
a technique .38 This means that understanding is knowing how to do something
i.e.to understand language means knowing how to use it .The above exposition
might lead us to a confusion as to whether understanding is an ability
.According to Wittgenstein ,the equation of understanding and ability is
misleading .Understanding is a kind of ability but the ability is to be
understood in the sense of actualities not in the sense of potentialities
.According to some ,ability is a mysterious state of the mind and we have
already seen the problems which might arise if abilities are defined in
terms of mental states .’Wittgenstein’s discussion points towards an
analysis of understanding as an ability .But in a perverse way this may ,if
care is not taken ,reinforce the fallacious conception of understanding as a
state .For one of the standard pitfalls in philosophical analysis of ability
is to think that an ability is itself a kind of state.39
Wittgenstein , therefore ,argues that understanding cannot
be defined as an ability .We might say at best that understanding is akin to
an ability .’Understanding closely resembles an ability ,but is altogether
unlike paradigmatic mental acts ,states or processes. Making correct
application of a term is a criterion for understanding it , just as
repeatedly
hitting the bull’s-eye is a criterion for having the capacity or skill of a
good archer.’40 One’s reaction manifests itself whether or not how one
understanding a term .One’s response occurs under a particular circumstance.
The use of a term under particular circumstance tells us whether or not one
has understood the word .This means that outside the non-linguistic
activities it is meaningless to speak of understanding.
Wittgenstein, thus attempts to clarify the notion of
understanding in terms of ‘use’. At this point, we are confronted with
another philosophical dispute, namely, whether Wittgenstein is a
behaviourist in disguise. According to behaviourism ,reports of mental
states are disguised reports of pieces of bodily behaviour; non-behavioural
mental states are merely the mythological constructions of a fertile
imagination .They ,therefore, reduce mental phenomena to neuro-physiological
phenomena and then explain mental states and processes in terms of
behaviour.
But Wittgenstein is not upholding a behaviouristic thesis
.He argues with behaviourists that the possibility of describing mental
events depends generally on their having an expression in behaviour but by
introducing the notion of use he actually intends to rebel against the
existence of all kinds of metaphysical ,occult entities .41Behaviourism
results if all mental terms are analysed in terms of behaviour and its
implication is that all so-called mental states are behaviours. But
Wittgenstein does not accept this implication ,he only observes that ‘to
ascribe a mental event or state to someone is not to ascribe to him any kind
of bodily behaviour; but such ascription can only sensibly be made to beings
which have at least the capability of behaviour of the appropriate kind.42
According to Wittgenstein philosophical problems arise out
of misinterpretations of ordinary language .He makes us aware of being
misled by superficial similarities between certain forms of expressions
which are the cause of our failure to have a clear view of our use of
words.To remove confusions ,unlike behaviourists,he does not deny the mental
process nor does he reduce mental states to bodily behaviour-he remains
non-commital .He simply ignores the existence of mental states and the
psychological process of understanding .Wittgenstein holds that words get
their meaning from their context of use and behaviour .In understanding the
word ‘red’ e.g. we pick out a red object from others on demand .There is no
reason for supposing that a red image is essential which enables us to use
the word in an appropriate context. It is a prejudice to suppose that we
must call up images in thinking .The picking out of a red object among
others is enough to show our understanding .So ,understanding cannot be
described as a private experience of which behaviour is a symptom .We know
others understanding also through use ‘. . . If we hear someone use the word
‘red ‘and are in doubt whether he understands it ,we can check by asking:
“which colour do you call red “?[PG. 41] .Other’s understanding is not known
through inference .The emphasis on the aspect of use does not contain
behaviouristic implication. The focus on use shows that a word in question
regularly accompanies such and such behaviour i. e. in a form of life the
word is associated with such an use .Hence, to understand the meaning of a
word one must understand the use which is rooted in a form of life.
There must be something common in language which is
responsible for our communication .In the preceding discussion we have seen
that both the foundationalists and the behaviourists acknowledge the
commonality of language due to which our communication becomes possible
.Foundationalists believe in a shared understanding which is common to all
human beings and we can communicate with each other due to the presence of
such a commonality.
Behaviourists ,on the other hand ,reduce all mental
phenomena to neuro-physiological phenomena ,i.e. biologically we have
something common which makes possible our communication .None of these views
have been received by Wittgenstein .He recognizes that there is something
common in language but unlike foundationalists and behaviourists he
explains commonality by the notion of use . By use he does not mean mere
instances of use .The use of a language must have a pattern and by
understanding the meaning we understand the pattern of use .According to
Wittgenstein ,language has a pattern ,the understanding of which is
essential for the communication of language .The pattern is not the
resultant of an a priori assumption nor is the pattern an outcome of
inductive generalization.The pattern is not something pregiven in language
which merely has to be recognized or discovered .Nobody can challenge its
authority because everyone is a member of some form of life .Therefore a
position cannot be taken outside the orbit of any form of life.
Bibliography
Chapter - II
1.See ,Scepticism,Rules and Language ,G. P.Baker and P. M. S. Hacker
,op.cit. ,p51.
2.’Ludwig Wittgenstein :Philosophy ,Experiment and Proof’ ,Alice Ambrose and
Morris Lazerowitz ,in British Philosophy in themed Century ,A Cambridge
Symposium,C. A. Mace, 2nd edition ,London,1966.
3.The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy ,F. Waismann, edited by R. Harre,
Macmillan, London,1968, p129.
4.See op. Cit Chapter vii ,I acknowledge that in order to explain the nature
of a rule I have followed the line of reasoning as suggested by Waismann.
5.See op. Cit. P. 132.
6.op. cit. P.143.
7.Scepticism ,Rules and Language, G. P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker, op.cit. p.
75.
8.’Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’,John Macdowell, in Synthese, vol. 58.
No.3,March 1984, p.350.
9.op. cit. ,p. 350-51
10.Wittgenstein’s Lectures,Cambridge : 1932-35,(eds.) Alice Ambrose,Basil
Blackwell, Oxford ,1982,p.31.
11.See, The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, F. Waismann,edited by R.
Harre, Mcmillian,London, 1968, p. 12.
12.The Claim of Reason :Wittgenstein Scepticism Morality and Tragedy
,Stanley Cavell, The Clarendon Press,Oxford ,1979 ,p.30.
13.The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy ,F. Waismann, op cit. P.12-13.
14.See, ‘Philosophy as Grammar and the Reality of Universals’ ,in Ludwig
Wittgenstein : Philosophy And Language ,eds. Alice Ambrose and M.
Lazerowitz,George Allen and Unwin Ltd. ,London,1972, p.142.
15.op. cit. ,p.142.
16.The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, F. Waismann, op. ,cit. ,p.40.
17.To organise this catalogue I have taken help from Insight and Illusion
,See in this connection pp.150-56.
18.The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, F. Waismann, op. Cit. ,p.13-14.
19.Insight and Illusion ,P. M. S. Hacker, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1975 ,p. 151.
20.See ,Philosophical Grammar ,p.44.
21.The principles of Linguistic Philosophy, F. Waismann, op. Cit., p.14.
22.op. cit. ,p.37.
23. op. Cit. P.39.
24.Linguistics, David Crystal,Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, 1973, p.82.
25. Scepticism, Rules and Language,G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker,op.
Cit.,p.110.
26.op. cit.,p.111.
27.’On Wittgenstein’s use of the term “Criterion”, Rogers Albritton ,in
Wittgenstein :The Philosophical Investigations, (eds.) George Pitcher
,Macmillan,London, 1968 ,p.236.
28.See,Insight and Illusion,P.M.S. Hacker,op. cit. Chapter x.
29.op. cit. P.290.
30.Wittgenstein, A. C.Grayling,Oxford University Press,Oxford, 1989, p.88.
31.Scepticism ,Rules and Language,G.P.Baker and P.M.S. Hacker ,op. cit.
P.111.
32.See.PI 151.
33.See PI. 153 ,154 ,155.
34.Wittgenstein, Anthony Kenny,Penguin Books Ltd.,Harmondsworth, 1986,p.140.
35.Wittgenstein : Understanding and Meaning, vol. I ,G.P.Baker and
P.M.S.Hacker ,Basil Blackwell,Oxford, 1980,p.603.
36. See ,PI. P. 59(a).
37.See, PI. 146.
38. See,PI. 199.
39.Wittgenstein : Understanding and Meaning, vol.I ,G.P.Baker and P.M.S.
Hacker,op.cit.,p.614.
40.Scepticism ,Rules and Language, G.P.Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, op.
cit.,p.118.
41.See, PI. 308.
42.Wittgenstein ,Anthony Kenny ,op. cit.p.17.


Chapter- III
Form of Life : Some Alternative Interpretations.
Introduction
In the previous chapters we have seen that Wittgenstein has provided a novel
exposition of language. He has entirely changed the notion of philosophizing
by defining language in terms of ‘use’. All important concepts of language
have been defined by the notion of use. There is no need of conceding any
grammatical core which essentially regulates our use of expressions. Use is
embedded in a form of life and to understand the meaning of an expression we
have to understand the form of life. The aim of Wittgenstein was to argue
against all a priori foundations of language ,on the one hand ,and to
explain regularities of practices on the other. For Wittgenstein, it is
erroneous to conceive of an objective domain with which no interaction is to
be made. The rejection of foundation begets a problem as to how the
generality or commonality of language is to be explained. To determine
meaning if one looks at mere instances of use one cannot attach meaning to
an expression. Language possesses a feature of generality which is essential
for communication. I think , therefore, that by rejecting the foundation, as
traditionally understood by philosophers, Wittgenstein has not given up the
notion of commonality. However, the commonality requirement does not lead
him to assume an essential feature of language .He simply looks at language
use and tries to find out this commonality. According to Wittgenstein ,the
basis of language is not something which can be abstracted by subtle
philosophical arguments ; it is already there in language ,and we just
notice it. One’s grammatical investigation reveals that language is actually
regulated by a form of life, all of our usages are embedded within it.
The feature of language which Wittgenstein highlights is
that language rests on an agreement; it is the agreement in a form of life
which provides the common basis for communication. By ‘agreement’ he does
not mean anything which can be established by a demonstrative proof ,’it is
meant to question whether a philosophical explanation is needed ,or wanted
for the fact of agreement in the language human beings use together ,an
explanation, say, in terms of meanings or conventions or basic terms or
propositions which are to provide the foundation of our agreement.’1
Commentators commenting on the nature of the agreement in
the ‘form of life’ interpret Wittgenstein’s intention variously. Sceptics
think that form of life is introduced for the solution of the sceptical
problem. Some are inclined to interpret it as something set up by mere
contract. Another interpretation in this connection is also available where
form of life has been treated realistically .Before arriving at our own
conclusions on this issue we need to briefly consider some of the salient
points made by the principal participants in this debate, namely ,the debate
on the role and nature of form of life.
Section – 1
Kripke on Wittgenstein’s Form of Life
For Kripke ,the central problem of the Investigations was to solve the
sceptical paradox relating to rule following the sceptical problem being
referred to by Kripke figures in the Investigations201 where in the
beginning of the passage Wittgenstein points out the paradox by saying that
we have every right to be sceptical about the notions of right and wrong
.With the abolition of essences and foundations everything seems to become
absolutely relative. The very rigidity associated with rules of language is
lost .If we continuously speak in terms of language-game then the same rule
could be corroborated or negated or in other words ,’every course’of action
can be made out to accord with the rule or conflict with it’(PI 201).It all
depends on how we interpret the rule .By reducing all language activities to
games all understanding becomes a matter of interpretation .If so, then
,whenever we utter an expression the hearer is free to interpret it as he
pleases and understand it as he pleases. There would be no guaranteed
commonality of understanding. No matter what interpretation is given it will
always be susceptible to sceptical doubt. Kripke, therefore , thinks that
the central problem of the Philosophical Investigations is a sceptical one
for which Wittgenstein gives a sceptical solution.2
Kripke holds that the notion of form of life is introduced
by Wittgenstein for the solution of his sceptical problem .It is the notion
which explains our agreement in language-use. Kripke agrees with the
Wittgenstein’s notion that language has no a priori essence, so no uniform
conformity is to be established .We agree in a set of responses because we
belong to the same form of life.’ The set of responses in which we agree ;
and the way they interweave with our activities ,is our form of life’.3We
can also imagine the possibility of another form of life where rules are
understood in another way .Since the interpretation of a rule is not
guaranteed by something essential people can conceive of a rule as they
choose .Individuals of another form of life can legitimately interpret the
rule of addition in a way different from ours .
Kripke ,therefore ,argues that there is no a priori
something ,a body of rules to which our use conforms .Then the question is
:What does our use conform to ,what determines the rightness or wrongness of
a rule ?An individual cannot adjudicate the rightness or wrongness because
he understands the meaning of an expression through private experience and
‘to think one is obeying a rule is not obeying a rule’(PI 202).If
understanding is treated as an inner private experience it always becomes
associated with interpretation .The consequence is solipcism that the
meaning is as I understand it. Kripke ,allegedly repudiates this solipcistic
position .He correctly apprehends that Wittgenstein’s aim was not to
establish solipcism .He instead tries to exclude privateness of language. As
Wittgenstein says ,’. . . it is not possible to obey a rule privately’ (PI
202).An individual alone cannot dictate meaning ,so ,a person considered in
isolation cannot obey a rule .At this juncture ,Kripke’s suggestion is :An
individual’s understanding of an expression can conform to the practice of
the community. An individual always interacts with a wider community. A
community attributes the criterion for rightness or wrongness and the
individual’s understanding conforms to standards laid down by the community
.According to Kripke ,an individual follows the behaviour of the community
and so long as he exhibits sufficient conformity he agrees in practices.
Individual’s agreement is essential for community practices .’There is no
objective fact – that we all mean addition by ‘+’, or even that a given
individual does –that explains our agreement in particular cases. Rather our
licence to say of each other that we mean addition by ‘+’ is part of a
‘language-game’ that sustains itself only because of the brute fact that we
generally agree ‘4 There is no objective constraint in understanding a rule
in one way rather than another. We understand a rule in a definite way
because we agree in a particular form of life and so long as agreement
prevails we understand each other. Kripke ,therefore ,maintains that
Wittgenstein upholds a form of mitigated relativism .
Kripke’s paradox is inevitable because he conceives of
understanding as being associated with interpretation. Though to attribute
meaning he does not depend on personal understanding he cannot avoid the
view that understanding mediates interpretation by introducing the idea of
‘community conformity’. Kripke correctly notices that an individual
considered in isolation cannot ascribe meaning to an expression .His
instance on ‘publicity’ corresponds with the thrust of Wittgenstein’s text
but he wrongly assimilates publicness with community conformity where
community-understanding is the understanding of a large number of
individuals and shared understanding is just a matter of matching in aspects
of an exterior. Consequently ,Kripke cannot avoid the privateness of
understanding by referring to the notion of community conformity;
understanding still hangs in the air.
The Investigations aims to solve a paradox ,but the paradox
arises not from the passage 201 of the PI ,as Kripke supposes ,but from the
assumption that understanding always involves interpretation. McDowell,
holds that the dilemma emerges not from ‘focusing on the individual in
isolation from any linguistic community’ but ‘it emerges as a condition for
the intelligibility of rejecting a premiss – the assimilation of
understanding to interpretation .‘5 In Kripke’s reading of the PI a paradox
figures in 201 and to elucidate the nature of the problem he has
concentrated on a part of the passage. To understand Wittgenstein’s
intention we must pay attention to the whole passage where he does not
presuppose that understanding involves interpretation .He says ,on the other
hand ,’there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation but
which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it”
in actual cases.’( PI 201).Focussing on a part of the passage instead of
concentrating on the whole passage Kripke begins to see sceptical elements
in Wittgenstein’s thought and to formulate a full-fledged thesis in
this direction
.He quotes such passages which go in favour of the sceptical thesis. The
drift of his argument is that he makes us aware of the fact that if care is
not taken the text may reinforce a sceptical interpretation of Wittgenstein.
As Kripke himself says, [ the thesis] should be thought of as
expounding neither
‘Wittgenstein’s argument nor ‘Kripke’s :rather Wittgenstein’s argument as it
struck Kripke ,as it presented a problem for him.’6
If Kripke’s rendering of Wittgenstein is correct. We have to
accept that meaning is an illusion. Baker and Hacker comment that Kripke’s
position is not only unacceptable but also self-refuting Kripke saws off the
branch ,on which he is sitting. It is not the case that the sceptic
certainly means either a or b by ‘w’ but is not sure which is the meaning
of ‘w’. ‘His conclusion is not that he certainly means either a or b by
‘w’, but cannot be sure ; nor is it that he knows what he now means, but
cannot be certain whether it is the same as what he meant yesterday .Rather
,he concludes with the ‘paradox ‘that there is no such thing as meaning ,so
language cannot be possible. But this is not scepticism at all ,it is
conceptual nihilism ;. . . it is manifestly self-refuting.’7
Anyone familiar with Wittgenstein’s work is acquainted with
Wittgenstein’s attitude towards scepticism. He systematically argues against
scepticism.8 He forcefully argues that it is not only irrefutable but
obvious non-sense. In On Certainty he presents an animated discussion on how
to answer scepticism.9
Section – 2
Form of Life as Interpreted by Crispin Wright
For Wright , the aim of Wittgenstein was to explain how our understanding is
shared , how we understand the meaning of an expression .In order to
understand the meaning of an expression we have to grasp the pattern of use,
but there is no objective investigation pattern to which our use conforms.
As Wright says ,
‘Wittgenstein seems almost to want to say that there is in
reality no substance to the idea of an expression being used in accordance
with its meaning ,that there is no sense in which we ,as language users can
be regarded as committed to certain patterns of linguistic usage by the
meanings which we attach to expressions.’10
Wright agrees with Kripke that there is no way of verifying whether the use
of an expression for Wittgenstein conforms to an investigation-independent
pattern, at the same time, nonetheless ,it is clear that Wittgenstein is not
upholding scepticism. According to him ,unless we rule out the possibility
of scepticism we have no right to speak of meaning .The sceptical problem
was to question our right to suppose that there is a shared understanding
.Sceptics assume first that our understanding is shared and then complain
that shared understanding is impossible .Wright ,therefore , thinks that
Wittgenstein attempts to answer the sceptic by telling us how to make sense
of the supposition of shared understanding ,he is also telling us how the
meaning of an expression is grasped.
According to Wright ,we can grasp the meaning of an
expression .But meaning is not guaranteed by investigation independent
facts. He assumes that the objectivity of statements consists in their
possession of determinate investigation independent truth values what Wright
calls investigation independence. If the statements conform to an
investigation independent fact statements are rendered to be true. Wright
observes that investigation –independent pattern is inaccessible to us
because no definitive explanation is to be provided for it .Wittgenstein
allows the possibility of formulating alternative explanations for the use
of expressions. According to Wright, ‘Wittgenstein never wearied of
reminding himself ,no explanation of the use of an expression is proof
against misunderstanding ; verbal explanations require correct understanding
of the vocabulary in which they are couched and samples are open to an
inexhaustible variety of interpretations’.11 Since ,there is no way of
verifying whether meaning of an expression conforms to pattern, an
individual is free to interpret meaning as he chooses. An individual has
privileged access to his own understanding and since conformity with
investigation-independent pattern is not possible he tries to guess at the
pattern of the application . So, understanding an expression is a kind of
‘cottoning on’ a ‘leap’ an ‘inspired guess’ at the pattern of application.’
Cottoning on ’indicates formation of right hypothesis and failing to do so
indicates forming the wrong one. An individual formulates a hypothesis in
order to know what somebody means by an expression and if his understanding
is sanctioned by the community , we can say that the use of the expression
is correct. The correctness of the expression is determined by the communal
authority , even though community cannot determine meaning conclusively
because no comparison can be made between communal verdict and ratification
independent fact .’If ‘correctness’ means ratification-independent
conformity with an antecedent pattern . . .there is absolutely nothing which
we can do to make the contrast active between the consensus description and
correct description ’12 Thus ,according to Wright ,it is the community
assent which supplies an essential background for speaking of an
individual’s responses as correct or incorrect. Community constitutes a
network of patterns in which the notion of correctness gets its sense.
‘Correctness’ does not mean ratification independent conformity with an
antecedent pattern so, when we are speaking of the pattern we speak about
the pattern of the community. Truly speaking ,we have no right to speak of
correctness we can at best say that community just behaves in this way
.Hence, all we can know for sure is how things seem to us to deserve
description. We can revise our assessment but then our revised assessment
would be only what seems right.
Wright’s interpretation also cannot be accepted because he was biased in
interpreting Wittgenstein’s position. He means by objectivity investigation
independent conformity with the antecedent pattern. A statement will be
regarded to be true if and only if it conforms to an investigation
independent fact .This requirement can never be fulfilled by later
Wittgenstein .The lack of fulfilling such conditions does not imply that
objectivity in meaning cannot be established .On the contrary ,Wittgenstein
tries to explain the notion of objectivity by introducing the notion of use.
The focus on the aspect of use does not make language flexible. Language is
grounded on something which gives stability to our understanding of
concepts. Language is not grounded on mere communal verdict .When we
understand the meaning of an expression we are not solely guided by
community assent we are somehow forced by the world to understand the
meaning of an expression in one way rather than another.
Section – III
Form of Life as Interpreted by McDowell
Both kripke and Wright fail to appreciate the thrust of Wittgenstein’s
position .According to them ,community assent ,form of life ,are ways of
interpreting reality ,formulating rules and criterion for understanding in
the face of total ignorance of the substantive fact of the matter. In
Kripke’s reading ,there is no objective fact which guarantees our use of
expressions. So, we have a right to be sceptical about the meaning of an
expression .We agree in a common form of life and define meaning of the
expression in a particular way. In Kripke’s own words ,’Wittgenstein
stresses the importance of agreement, and of a shared form of life ,for his
solution to his sceptical problem.’13 In Wrights reading also we cannot
grasp an investigation independent pattern so we have no way of knowing for
sure about the meaning of expressions because the picture of ideolectic
pattern makes no room for a distinction between actually conforming and
merely having the impression that one is conforming. Wright himself says
,’None of us unilaterally can make sense of the idea of correct employment
of language save by reference to the authority of securable communal assent
on the matter ; and for the community itself there is no authority ,so no
standard to meet.’14 Since ,ratification independent pattern cannot be
grasped ,meaning is ,as community says. Since no direct encounter with
reality can be established understanding and meaning are achieved through the
mediation of interpretation.
Now ,if there is always a need for interpretation there is
always a scope left open for misinterpretation in the absence of sufficient
conformity with a priori pattern (as Kripke says, or investigation
independent pattern as Wright holds). Consequently by the Kripke /Wright
explanation of shared understanding the sceptic is not really silenced. All
that their explanation achieves is merely a basis for shared beliefs – the
basis is form of life. But in the case of misunderstanding there is no fact
of the matter which can resolve the dispute .McDowell contests this point.
According to him the aim of Wittgenstein was not to uphold scepticism but
to correct the misunderstanding on which it depends. He thinks that only way
to silence the sceptic is by acknowledging the fact that there can be
understanding without the mediation of interpretation .There is no gap
between language and meaning or language and understanding. Meaning and
understanding are directedly connected with our practices ,i.e. language is
to be understood without mediation of interpretation. They show themselves
through practices, they are manifested in use. As he says ,’How do I know
that the colour that I am now seeing is called “green”? Well, to confirm it
I might ask other people; but if they did not agree with me ,I should
become confused and should perhaps take them or myself for crazy. That is to
say : I should either no longer trust myself to judge ,or no longer react to
what they say to a judgement.
If I am drowning and I shout “Help” :how do I know what the
word Help means? Well, that’s how I react in this situation – Now that is
how I know what “green” means as well and also know how I have to follow
the rule in the particular case.’[RFM VI-35]
McDowell makes a distinction between the bedrock and the
supervenient level of language. We ask for justification at the intermediate
level, the level between bedrock and the supervenient level .According to
Wittgenstein , the process of asking for explanation cannot continue for
ever .At a certain stage we reach rock-bottom. There is no question of
asking for justification at the bed-rock level. This is the level at which
all justifications are exhausted , the spade is turned .One simply describes
the practice.
According to Wittgenstein ,there must be a something given
in language. If one requires explanation of what is already given in
language he must speak about non-sense. There is nothing occult in language.
At the bedrock level one simply uses expressions, one simply describes the
practice. ’If I have exhausted the justification I have reached bedrock ,and
my spade is turned .’Then I am inclined to say : “This is simply what I do”
‘[PI 217].
One may think that at the bedrock one’s use of an expression
without justification is irrational. Wittgenstein’s point is that at the
rock-bottom using of an expression without justification cannot be said to
be irrational-it means that there is no need of giving further
justifications .’To use a word without justification does not mean to use
without right’[PI 289]. One instead obeys the rule blindly 15.That one is
obeying the rule is manifested in the actual application of the expression.
As Wittgenstein says,
‘It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact
that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another;
as if each one contented us at least for a moment ,until we thought of yet
another standing behind it. What this shows is that there is a way of
grasping a rule which is not an interpretation,but which is exhibited in
what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases’ [PI
201].
On McDowell’s reading the central concern of Wittgenstein
was to give an answer to the question : How can a performance both be
nothing but a ‘blind ‘reaction to a situation ,not an act on an
interpretation; and be a case of going by a rule? For McDowell the answer
can be given with reference to practice, custom or institution. At the basic
level ,one directly reacts to a situation but this does not imply that
there are no norms. If it is supposed that there are no norms at the basic
level we cannot prevent meaning from becoming illusory and communication
becomes impossible. The aim of Wittgenstein was not to support this
position. He has accepted the fact that we do communicate with each other
and all his efforts are directed in explaining how this has been possible.
According to McDowell, at the rock bottom one directly
reacts to a situation, one’s action cannot be described as an act or an
interpretation. One still obeys the rules. One understands the meaning of
expressions, because one’s understanding is within the framework of communal
practice. Within the communal set up one directly understands the meaning of
expressions.
According to Wittgenstein , there is nothing hidden in
language. No occult meaning is possible .We need not go beyond language for
the justification of what is already given in language .Wittgenstein has
accepted that there is something given in language and the given is form of
life. At the rock bottom instead of asking for further explanation one sees
the form of life and makes use of an expression. Meaning shows itself in
use.
Both Kripke and Wright have referred to communal practice.
On Kripke’s view, if we consider an individual in isolation we cannot speak
of meaning. Meaning must be public ; individual’s understanding must conform
to the community practice, where community is just a large number of
individuals. McDowell agrees with Kripke that ‘the insistence on publicity
in Kripke’s reading corresponds broadly with Wittgensteinian thought’16 but
the notion of publicity does not arise from the assumption that meaning is
inapplicable to a single person considered in isolation. It arises from the
assumption that understanding is associated with interpretation.
Wright’s interpretation of community practice also fails to
represent the Wittgensteinian position. According to Wright, we cannot know
investigation independent pattern ;so ,we have no right to speak of meaning
.It is a community assent which supplies the background against which it
makes sense to think of an individual’s responses as correct .Community
constitutes a network of pattern within which we speak of meaning .Thus on
Wright’s observation, there is no way of verifying whether communal judgment
conforms to any ratification independent pattern. What the community
says right
, is right and for the community there is no standard to meet.’ What we
think of as a shared language is at best a set of corresponding
ideolects’.17
McDowell does not agree with Wright’s suggestion .He
acknowledges the importance of community practice but not in Wright’s sense.
When Wright speaks of community he actually speaks of private practice and
when McDowell speaks of community he refers to public practice .On
McDowell’s observation the publicity emerges ‘as a condition of the
possibility of rejecting the assimilation of understanding to
interpretation’18
Hence, communal practice need not be described as an
agreement in opinion .An opinion is something for which one may ask for a
justification. If we describe communal practice as an agreement in opinion
we are opening the door for theorization .We have observed in previous
chapters that Wittgenstein argues against all kinds of theorization .At the
rock bottom all justifications are exhausted .Interpretations come to an
end. It is unnecessary to ask for further justifications, one simply uses
expressions. One shifts from asking to doing simply because there is nothing
left for justifications. Meaning is there given and one directly understands
the meaning of expressions. So, one’s reaction to a situation cannot be
considered to be irrational, normativeness is present at the rock bottom as
well. This is expressed in one’s practices, in uses of expressions. Wright
also accommodates normativeness at the basic level but his reference to
normativeness is not independent of interpretation of the community. Whereas
, for McDowell ,understanding is delinked from interpretation, community
itself is embedded within a form of life. The option is not open to
understand expressions in one way rather than another. He ,therefore, thinks
that hearing a word in one sense rather is hearing it one position rather
than another, in the network of possible patterns of making sense that we
learn to find ourselves when we acquire mastery of a language.
For McDowell, to see in the network of a pattern is to see
in a form of life. There may be a direct cognitive contact among members of
a linguistic community. One can communicate with others.’. . . shared
membership in a linguistic community is not just a matter of matching in
aspects of an exterior that we present to anyone whatever ,but equips us to
make our minds available to one another ,by confronting one another with a
different exterior from that which we present to outsiders.’19 The speaker
shares the hearer ‘s understanding but sharing does not mean external
sharing but meeting of minds.20’. . .a linguistic community is conceived as
bound together ,not by a match in externals (facts accessible to just
anyone) ;but by a capacity for a meeting of minds.’21
McDowell, therefore, is inclined to say that form of life is
the determinant of our use of expressions. He thereby draws our attention to
the vital role played by human activity in a communal set up. This human
activity in a communal set up must be taken into consideration while
determining the meaning of an expression. In other words ,the use of an
expression determines its meaning ,not just any use but use in a communal
set up. So, when one utters a meaningful sentence one is governed by
constraints.
The outcome of these reflections is of great
significance. The rejection of foundation in the traditional sense does not
make our communication impossible. In order to communicate through language
people must agree with one another about the meaning of words. It is
essential for communication that we agree in a large number of judgments. We
, therefore, have to presuppose that there is something common in language.
From our discussion it is clear that he has succeeded in explaining the
commonality of language. We share a common form of life ,and it is in
respect of a form of life that communication becomes possible.
Wittgenstein argues that form of life is given and its
identification is to be found through use. So, commonality is already there
in language and in knowing the rules one knows it .His reference to use does
not make room for ideosyncracy. Wittgenstein does not allow one to
understand language as one wishes and interpret language as one pleases .We
do not have a choice about language, it is given. So ,form of life is there,
nobody can choose one form of life.
Footnotes.
Chapter – III
1.The Claim of Reason,Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality and Tragedy,Stanley
Cavell,The Clarendon Press,Oxford,1979, p.33.
2.Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language : An Elementary Exposition,Saul
Kripke,Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1988.
3.op. cit. P. 96.
4.Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language : An Elementary Exposition,
Saul Kripke, op. cit.,p.97.
5.’Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’,John McDowell, in Synthese, vol.
58.,No.3 ,March 1984, p.342-43.
6.Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language :An Elementary Exposition, Saul
Kripke, op. cit.p.5.
7.Scepticism ,Rules and Language, G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker,op. cit.
1985, p.6.
8.See,Note Books 1914-15, Ludwig Wittgenstein, edited by G.H. Von Wright and
G.E.M. Anscombe,2nd edition Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford,
1979.
9.See Wittgenstein, Anthony Kenny, Penguin Books
Ltd.,Harmondsworth,1986,Chapter-11.
10.Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics, Crispin
Wright,Duckworth,London,1980,P.21
11.’Rule Following, Objectivity and The Theory of Meaning’ ,Crispin Wright,
in Wittgenstein : to Follow a Rule; edited by H. Steven Holtzman and
Cristopher M. Leich, Routledge and Kegan Paul,London, 1981, p.100.
12.op. cit. P.105.
13.Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language : An Elementary Exposition,
Saul A Kripke,Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1988,p.96.
14.’Rule Following ,Objectivity and the Theory of Meaning’ in Wittgenstein
:To Follow a Rule,op.cit.p.105.
15.See,PI 219.
16.’Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’ in Synthese, vol.58, No.3., March
,1984,p.342.
17.’Wittgenstein on Following a Rule ‘,John McDowell, in Synthese op. cit.
P.348.
18.op.cit. p.356.
19.op. cit. ,p. 350.
20.When McDowell speaks of ‘direct cognitive contact’ and ‘meeting of minds’
it would be misleading to suppose that he refers to a kind of ‘intuition’.T
he expression ‘direct cognitive contact ‘ is used to highlight the aspect
that one can directly grasp the meaning of an expression ,there is no need
of interpretation for the understanding of the expression .Within a communal
framework or form of life ,one is able to know other’s understanding without
mediation of interpretation.
21.’Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’,John McDowell, op. cit. ,p.351.
Chapter- III
Form of Life : Some Alternative Interpretations.
Introduction
In the previous chapters we have seen that Wittgenstein has provided a novel
exposition of language. He has entirely changed the notion of philosophizing
by defining language in terms of ‘use’. All important concepts of language
have been defined by the notion of use. There is no need of conceding any
grammatical core which essentially regulates our use of expressions. Use is
embedded in a form of life and to understand the meaning of an expression we
have to understand the form of life. The aim of Wittgenstein was to argue
against all a priori foundations of language ,on the one hand ,and to
explain regularities of practices on the other. For Wittgenstein, it is
erroneous to conceive of an objective domain with which no interaction is to
be made. The rejection of foundation begets a problem as to how the
generality or commonality of language is to be explained. To determine
meaning if one looks at mere instances of use one cannot attach meaning to
an expression. Language possesses a feature of generality which is essential
for communication. I think , therefore, that by rejecting the foundation, as
traditionally understood by philosophers, Wittgenstein has not given up the
notion of commonality. However, the commonality requirement does not lead
him to assume an essential feature of language .He simply looks at language
use and tries to find out this commonality. According to Wittgenstein ,the
basis of language is not something which can be abstracted by subtle
philosophical arguments ; it is already there in language ,and we just
notice it. One’s grammatical investigation reveals that language is actually
regulated by a form of life, all of our usages are embedded within it.
The feature of language which Wittgenstein highlights is
that language rests on an agreement; it is the agreement in a form of life
which provides the common basis for communication. By ‘agreement’ he does
not mean anything which can be established by a demonstrative proof ,’it is
meant to question whether a philosophical explanation is needed ,or wanted
for the fact of agreement in the language human beings use together ,an
explanation, say, in terms of meanings or conventions or basic terms or
propositions which are to provide the foundation of our agreement.’1
Commentators commenting on the nature of the agreement in
the ‘form of life’ interpret Wittgenstein’s intention variously. Sceptics
think that form of life is introduced for the solution of the sceptical
problem. Some are inclined to interpret it as something set up by mere
contract. Another interpretation in this connection is also available where
form of life has been treated realistically .Before arriving at our own
conclusions on this issue we need to briefly consider some of the salient
points made by the principal participants in this debate, namely ,the debate
on the role and nature of form of life.
Section – 1
Kripke on Wittgenstein’s Form of Life
For Kripke ,the central problem of the Investigations was to solve the
sceptical paradox relating to rule following the sceptical problem being
referred to by Kripke figures in the Investigations201 where in the
beginning of the passage Wittgenstein points out the paradox by saying that
we have every right to be sceptical about the notions of right and wrong
.With the abolition of essences and foundations everything seems to become
absolutely relative. The very rigidity associated with rules of language is
lost .If we continuously speak in terms of language-game then the same rule
could be corroborated or negated or in other words ,’every course’of action
can be made out to accord with the rule or conflict with it’(PI 201).It all
depends on how we interpret the rule .By reducing all language activities to
games all understanding becomes a matter of interpretation .If so, then
,whenever we utter an expression the hearer is free to interpret it as he
pleases and understand it as he pleases. There would be no guaranteed
commonality of understanding. No matter what interpretation is given it will
always be susceptible to sceptical doubt. Kripke, therefore , thinks that
the central problem of the Philosophical Investigations is a sceptical one
for which Wittgenstein gives a sceptical solution.2
Kripke holds that the notion of form of life is introduced
by Wittgenstein for the solution of his sceptical problem .It is the notion
which explains our agreement in language-use. Kripke agrees with the
Wittgenstein’s notion that language has no a priori essence, so no uniform
conformity is to be established .We agree in a set of responses because we
belong to the same form of life.’ The set of responses in which we agree ;
and the way they interweave with our activities ,is our form of life’.3We
can also imagine the possibility of another form of life where rules are
understood in another way .Since the interpretation of a rule is not
guaranteed by something essential people can conceive of a rule as they
choose .Individuals of another form of life can legitimately interpret the
rule of addition in a way different from ours .
Kripke ,therefore ,argues that there is no a priori
something ,a body of rules to which our use conforms .Then the question is
:What does our use conform to ,what determines the rightness or wrongness of
a rule ?An individual cannot adjudicate the rightness or wrongness because
he understands the meaning of an expression through private experience and
‘to think one is obeying a rule is not obeying a rule’(PI 202).If
understanding is treated as an inner private experience it always becomes
associated with interpretation .The consequence is solipcism that the
meaning is as I understand it. Kripke ,allegedly repudiates this solipcistic
position .He correctly apprehends that Wittgenstein’s aim was not to
establish solipcism .He instead tries to exclude privateness of language. As
Wittgenstein says ,’. . . it is not possible to obey a rule privately’ (PI
202).An individual alone cannot dictate meaning ,so ,a person considered in
isolation cannot obey a rule .At this juncture ,Kripke’s suggestion is :An
individual’s understanding of an expression can conform to the practice of
the community. An individual always interacts with a wider community. A
community attributes the criterion for rightness or wrongness and the
individual’s understanding conforms to standards laid down by the community
.According to Kripke ,an individual follows the behaviour of the community
and so long as he exhibits sufficient conformity he agrees in practices.
Individual’s agreement is essential for community practices .’There is no
objective fact – that we all mean addition by ‘+’, or even that a given
individual does –that explains our agreement in particular cases. Rather our
licence to say of each other that we mean addition by ‘+’ is part of a
‘language-game’ that sustains itself only because of the brute fact that we
generally agree ‘4 There is no objective constraint in understanding a rule
in one way rather than another. We understand a rule in a definite way
because we agree in a particular form of life and so long as agreement
prevails we understand each other. Kripke ,therefore ,maintains that
Wittgenstein upholds a form of mitigated relativism .
Kripke’s paradox is inevitable because he conceives of
understanding as being associated with interpretation. Though to attribute
meaning he does not depend on personal understanding he cannot avoid the
view that understanding mediates interpretation by introducing the idea of
‘community conformity’. Kripke correctly notices that an individual
considered in isolation cannot ascribe meaning to an expression .His
instance on ‘publicity’ corresponds with the thrust of Wittgenstein’s text
but he wrongly assimilates publicness with community conformity where
community-understanding is the understanding of a large number of
individuals and shared understanding is just a matter of matching in aspects
of an exterior. Consequently ,Kripke cannot avoid the privateness of
understanding by referring to the notion of community conformity;
understanding still hangs in the air.
The Investigations aims to solve a paradox ,but the paradox
arises not from the passage 201 of the PI ,as Kripke supposes ,but from the
assumption that understanding always involves interpretation. McDowell,
holds that the dilemma emerges not from ‘focusing on the individual in
isolation from any linguistic community’ but ‘it emerges as a condition for
the intelligibility of rejecting a premiss – the assimilation of
understanding to interpretation .‘5 In Kripke’s reading of the PI a paradox
figures in 201 and to elucidate the nature of the problem he has
concentrated on a part of the passage. To understand Wittgenstein’s
intention we must pay attention to the whole passage where he does not
presuppose that understanding involves interpretation .He says ,on the other
hand ,’there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation but
which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it”
in actual cases.’( PI 201).Focussing on a part of the passage instead of
concentrating on the whole passage Kripke begins to see sceptical elements
in Wittgenstein’s thought and to formulate a full-fledged thesis in
this direction
.He quotes such passages which go in favour of the sceptical thesis. The
drift of his argument is that he makes us aware of the fact that if care is
not taken the text may reinforce a sceptical interpretation of Wittgenstein.
As Kripke himself says, [ the thesis] should be thought of as
expounding neither
‘Wittgenstein’s argument nor ‘Kripke’s :rather Wittgenstein’s argument as it
struck Kripke ,as it presented a problem for him.’6
If Kripke’s rendering of Wittgenstein is correct. We have to
accept that meaning is an illusion. Baker and Hacker comment that Kripke’s
position is not only unacceptable but also self-refuting Kripke saws off the
branch ,on which he is sitting. It is not the case that the sceptic
certainly means either a or b by ‘w’ but is not sure which is the meaning
of ‘w’. ‘His conclusion is not that he certainly means either a or b by
‘w’, but cannot be sure ; nor is it that he knows what he now means, but
cannot be certain whether it is the same as what he meant yesterday .Rather
,he concludes with the ‘paradox ‘that there is no such thing as meaning ,so
language cannot be possible. But this is not scepticism at all ,it is
conceptual nihilism ;. . . it is manifestly self-refuting.’7
Anyone familiar with Wittgenstein’s work is acquainted with
Wittgenstein’s attitude towards scepticism. He systematically argues against
scepticism.8 He forcefully argues that it is not only irrefutable but
obvious non-sense. In On Certainty he presents an animated discussion on how
to answer scepticism.9
Section – 2
Form of Life as Interpreted by Crispin Wright
For Wright , the aim of Wittgenstein was to explain how our understanding is
shared , how we understand the meaning of an expression .In order to
understand the meaning of an expression we have to grasp the pattern of use,
but there is no objective investigation pattern to which our use conforms.
As Wright says ,
‘Wittgenstein seems almost to want to say that there is in
reality no substance to the idea of an expression being used in accordance
with its meaning ,that there is no sense in which we ,as language users can
be regarded as committed to certain patterns of linguistic usage by the
meanings which we attach to expressions.’10
Wright agrees with Kripke that there is no way of verifying whether the use
of an expression for Wittgenstein conforms to an investigation-independent
pattern, at the same time, nonetheless ,it is clear that Wittgenstein is not
upholding scepticism. According to him ,unless we rule out the possibility
of scepticism we have no right to speak of meaning .The sceptical problem
was to question our right to suppose that there is a shared understanding
.Sceptics assume first that our understanding is shared and then complain
that shared understanding is impossible .Wright ,therefore , thinks that
Wittgenstein attempts to answer the sceptic by telling us how to make sense
of the supposition of shared understanding ,he is also telling us how the
meaning of an expression is grasped.
According to Wright ,we can grasp the meaning of an
expression .But meaning is not guaranteed by investigation independent
facts. He assumes that the objectivity of statements consists in their
possession of determinate investigation independent truth values what Wright
calls investigation independence. If the statements conform to an
investigation independent fact statements are rendered to be true. Wright
observes that investigation –independent pattern is inaccessible to us
because no definitive explanation is to be provided for it .Wittgenstein
allows the possibility of formulating alternative explanations for the use
of expressions. According to Wright, ‘Wittgenstein never wearied of
reminding himself ,no explanation of the use of an expression is proof
against misunderstanding ; verbal explanations require correct understanding
of the vocabulary in which they are couched and samples are open to an
inexhaustible variety of interpretations’.11 Since ,there is no way of
verifying whether meaning of an expression conforms to pattern, an
individual is free to interpret meaning as he chooses. An individual has
privileged access to his own understanding and since conformity with
investigation-independent pattern is not possible he tries to guess at the
pattern of the application . So, understanding an expression is a kind of
‘cottoning on’ a ‘leap’ an ‘inspired guess’ at the pattern of application.’
Cottoning on ’indicates formation of right hypothesis and failing to do so
indicates forming the wrong one. An individual formulates a hypothesis in
order to know what somebody means by an expression and if his understanding
is sanctioned by the community , we can say that the use of the expression
is correct. The correctness of the expression is determined by the communal
authority , even though community cannot determine meaning conclusively
because no comparison can be made between communal verdict and ratification
independent fact .’If ‘correctness’ means ratification-independent
conformity with an antecedent pattern . . .there is absolutely nothing which
we can do to make the contrast active between the consensus description and
correct description ’12 Thus ,according to Wright ,it is the community
assent which supplies an essential background for speaking of an
individual’s responses as correct or incorrect. Community constitutes a
network of patterns in which the notion of correctness gets its sense.
‘Correctness’ does not mean ratification independent conformity with an
antecedent pattern so, when we are speaking of the pattern we speak about
the pattern of the community. Truly speaking ,we have no right to speak of
correctness we can at best say that community just behaves in this way
.Hence, all we can know for sure is how things seem to us to deserve
description. We can revise our assessment but then our revised assessment
would be only what seems right.
Wright’s interpretation also cannot be accepted because he was biased in
interpreting Wittgenstein’s position. He means by objectivity investigation
independent conformity with the antecedent pattern. A statement will be
regarded to be true if and only if it conforms to an investigation
independent fact .This requirement can never be fulfilled by later
Wittgenstein .The lack of fulfilling such conditions does not imply that
objectivity in meaning cannot be established .On the contrary ,Wittgenstein
tries to explain the notion of objectivity by introducing the notion of use.
The focus on the aspect of use does not make language flexible. Language is
grounded on something which gives stability to our understanding of
concepts. Language is not grounded on mere communal verdict .When we
understand the meaning of an expression we are not solely guided by
community assent we are somehow forced by the world to understand the
meaning of an expression in one way rather than another.
Section – III
Form of Life as Interpreted by McDowell
Both kripke and Wright fail to appreciate the thrust of Wittgenstein’s
position .According to them ,community assent ,form of life ,are ways of
interpreting reality ,formulating rules and criterion for understanding in
the face of total ignorance of the substantive fact of the matter. In
Kripke’s reading ,there is no objective fact which guarantees our use of
expressions. So, we have a right to be sceptical about the meaning of an
expression .We agree in a common form of life and define meaning of the
expression in a particular way. In Kripke’s own words ,’Wittgenstein
stresses the importance of agreement, and of a shared form of life ,for his
solution to his sceptical problem.’13 In Wrights reading also we cannot
grasp an investigation independent pattern so we have no way of knowing for
sure about the meaning of expressions because the picture of ideolectic
pattern makes no room for a distinction between actually conforming and
merely having the impression that one is conforming. Wright himself says
,’None of us unilaterally can make sense of the idea of correct employment
of language save by reference to the authority of securable communal assent
on the matter ; and for the community itself there is no authority ,so no
standard to meet.’14 Since ,ratification independent pattern cannot be
grasped ,meaning is ,as community says. Since no direct encounter with
reality can be established understanding and meaning are achieved through the
mediation of interpretation.
Now ,if there is always a need for interpretation there is
always a scope left open for misinterpretation in the absence of sufficient
conformity with a priori pattern (as Kripke says, or investigation
independent pattern as Wright holds). Consequently by the Kripke /Wright
explanation of shared understanding the sceptic is not really silenced. All
that their explanation achieves is merely a basis for shared beliefs – the
basis is form of life. But in the case of misunderstanding there is no fact
of the matter which can resolve the dispute .McDowell contests this point.
According to him the aim of Wittgenstein was not to uphold scepticism but
to correct the misunderstanding on which it depends. He thinks that only way
to silence the sceptic is by acknowledging the fact that there can be
understanding without the mediation of interpretation .There is no gap
between language and meaning or language and understanding. Meaning and
understanding are directedly connected with our practices ,i.e. language is
to be understood without mediation of interpretation. They show themselves
through practices, they are manifested in use. As he says ,’How do I know
that the colour that I am now seeing is called “green”? Well, to confirm it
I might ask other people; but if they did not agree with me ,I should
become confused and should perhaps take them or myself for crazy. That is to
say : I should either no longer trust myself to judge ,or no longer react to
what they say to a judgement.
If I am drowning and I shout “Help” :how do I know what the
word Help means? Well, that’s how I react in this situation – Now that is
how I know what “green” means as well and also know how I have to follow
the rule in the particular case.’[RFM VI-35]
McDowell makes a distinction between the bedrock and the
supervenient level of language. We ask for justification at the intermediate
level, the level between bedrock and the supervenient level .According to
Wittgenstein , the process of asking for explanation cannot continue for
ever .At a certain stage we reach rock-bottom. There is no question of
asking for justification at the bed-rock level. This is the level at which
all justifications are exhausted , the spade is turned .One simply describes
the practice.
According to Wittgenstein ,there must be a something given
in language. If one requires explanation of what is already given in
language he must speak about non-sense. There is nothing occult in language.
At the bedrock level one simply uses expressions, one simply describes the
practice. ’If I have exhausted the justification I have reached bedrock ,and
my spade is turned .’Then I am inclined to say : “This is simply what I do”
‘[PI 217].
One may think that at the bedrock one’s use of an expression
without justification is irrational. Wittgenstein’s point is that at the
rock-bottom using of an expression without justification cannot be said to
be irrational-it means that there is no need of giving further
justifications .’To use a word without justification does not mean to use
without right’[PI 289]. One instead obeys the rule blindly 15.That one is
obeying the rule is manifested in the actual application of the expression.
As Wittgenstein says,
‘It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact
that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another;
as if each one contented us at least for a moment ,until we thought of yet
another standing behind it. What this shows is that there is a way of
grasping a rule which is not an interpretation,but which is exhibited in
what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases’ [PI
201].
On McDowell’s reading the central concern of Wittgenstein
was to give an answer to the question : How can a performance both be
nothing but a ‘blind ‘reaction to a situation ,not an act on an
interpretation; and be a case of going by a rule? For McDowell the answer
can be given with reference to practice, custom or institution. At the basic
level ,one directly reacts to a situation but this does not imply that
there are no norms. If it is supposed that there are no norms at the basic
level we cannot prevent meaning from becoming illusory and communication
becomes impossible. The aim of Wittgenstein was not to support this
position. He has accepted the fact that we do communicate with each other
and all his efforts are directed in explaining how this has been possible.
According to McDowell, at the rock bottom one directly
reacts to a situation, one’s action cannot be described as an act or an
interpretation. One still obeys the rules. One understands the meaning of
expressions, because one’s understanding is within the framework of communal
practice. Within the communal set up one directly understands the meaning of
expressions.
According to Wittgenstein , there is nothing hidden in
language. No occult meaning is possible .We need not go beyond language for
the justification of what is already given in language .Wittgenstein has
accepted that there is something given in language and the given is form of
life. At the rock bottom instead of asking for further explanation one sees
the form of life and makes use of an expression. Meaning shows itself in
use.
Both Kripke and Wright have referred to communal practice.
On Kripke’s view, if we consider an individual in isolation we cannot speak
of meaning. Meaning must be public ; individual’s understanding must conform
to the community practice, where community is just a large number of
individuals. McDowell agrees with Kripke that ‘the insistence on publicity
in Kripke’s reading corresponds broadly with Wittgensteinian thought’16 but
the notion of publicity does not arise from the assumption that meaning is
inapplicable to a single person considered in isolation. It arises from the
assumption that understanding is associated with interpretation.
Wright’s interpretation of community practice also fails to
represent the Wittgensteinian position. According to Wright, we cannot know
investigation independent pattern ;so ,we have no right to speak of meaning
.It is a community assent which supplies the background against which it
makes sense to think of an individual’s responses as correct .Community
constitutes a network of pattern within which we speak of meaning .Thus on
Wright’s observation, there is no way of verifying whether communal judgment
conforms to any ratification independent pattern. What the community
says right
, is right and for the community there is no standard to meet.’ What we
think of as a shared language is at best a set of corresponding
ideolects’.17
McDowell does not agree with Wright’s suggestion .He
acknowledges the importance of community practice but not in Wright’s sense.
When Wright speaks of community he actually speaks of private practice and
when McDowell speaks of community he refers to public practice .On
McDowell’s observation the publicity emerges ‘as a condition of the
possibility of rejecting the assimilation of understanding to
interpretation’18
Hence, communal practice need not be described as an
agreement in opinion .An opinion is something for which one may ask for a
justification. If we describe communal practice as an agreement in opinion
we are opening the door for theorization .We have observed in previous
chapters that Wittgenstein argues against all kinds of theorization .At the
rock bottom all justifications are exhausted .Interpretations come to an
end. It is unnecessary to ask for further justifications, one simply uses
expressions. One shifts from asking to doing simply because there is nothing
left for justifications. Meaning is there given and one directly understands
the meaning of expressions. So, one’s reaction to a situation cannot be
considered to be irrational, normativeness is present at the rock bottom as
well. This is expressed in one’s practices, in uses of expressions. Wright
also accommodates normativeness at the basic level but his reference to
normativeness is not independent of interpretation of the community. Whereas
, for McDowell ,understanding is delinked from interpretation, community
itself is embedded within a form of life. The option is not open to
understand expressions in one way rather than another. He ,therefore, thinks
that hearing a word in one sense rather is hearing it one position rather
than another, in the network of possible patterns of making sense that we
learn to find ourselves when we acquire mastery of a language.
For McDowell, to see in the network of a pattern is to see
in a form of life. There may be a direct cognitive contact among members of
a linguistic community. One can communicate with others.’. . . shared
membership in a linguistic community is not just a matter of matching in
aspects of an exterior that we present to anyone whatever ,but equips us to
make our minds available to one another ,by confronting one another with a
different exterior from that which we present to outsiders.’19 The speaker
shares the hearer ‘s understanding but sharing does not mean external
sharing but meeting of minds.20’. . .a linguistic community is conceived as
bound together ,not by a match in externals (facts accessible to just
anyone) ;but by a capacity for a meeting of minds.’21
McDowell, therefore, is inclined to say that form of life is
the determinant of our use of expressions. He thereby draws our attention to
the vital role played by human activity in a communal set up. This human
activity in a communal set up must be taken into consideration while
determining the meaning of an expression. In other words ,the use of an
expression determines its meaning ,not just any use but use in a communal
set up. So, when one utters a meaningful sentence one is governed by
constraints.
The outcome of these reflections is of great
significance. The rejection of foundation in the traditional sense does not
make our communication impossible. In order to communicate through language
people must agree with one another about the meaning of words. It is
essential for communication that we agree in a large number of judgments. We
, therefore, have to presuppose that there is something common in language.
From our discussion it is clear that he has succeeded in explaining the
commonality of language. We share a common form of life ,and it is in
respect of a form of life that communication becomes possible.
Wittgenstein argues that form of life is given and its
identification is to be found through use. So, commonality is already there
in language and in knowing the rules one knows it .His reference to use does
not make room for ideosyncracy. Wittgenstein does not allow one to
understand language as one wishes and interpret language as one pleases .We
do not have a choice about language, it is given. So ,form of life is there,
nobody can choose one form of life.
Footnotes.
Chapter – III
1.The Claim of Reason,Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality and Tragedy,Stanley
Cavell,The Clarendon Press,Oxford,1979, p.33.
2.Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language : An Elementary Exposition,Saul
Kripke,Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1988.
3.op. cit. P. 96.
4.Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language : An Elementary Exposition,
Saul Kripke, op. cit.,p.97.
5.’Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’,John McDowell, in Synthese, vol.
58.,No.3 ,March 1984, p.342-43.
6.Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language :An Elementary Exposition, Saul
Kripke, op. cit.p.5.
7.Scepticism ,Rules and Language, G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker,op. cit.
1985, p.6.
8.See,Note Books 1914-15, Ludwig Wittgenstein, edited by G.H. Von Wright and
G.E.M. Anscombe,2nd edition Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford,
1979.
9.See Wittgenstein, Anthony Kenny, Penguin Books
Ltd.,Harmondsworth,1986,Chapter-11.
10.Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics, Crispin
Wright,Duckworth,London,1980,P.21
11.’Rule Following, Objectivity and The Theory of Meaning’ ,Crispin Wright,
in Wittgenstein : to Follow a Rule; edited by H. Steven Holtzman and
Cristopher M. Leich, Routledge and Kegan Paul,London, 1981, p.100.
12.op. cit. P.105.
13.Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language : An Elementary Exposition,
Saul A Kripke,Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1988,p.96.
14.’Rule Following ,Objectivity and the Theory of Meaning’ in Wittgenstein
:To Follow a Rule,op.cit.p.105.
15.See,PI 219.
16.’Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’ in Synthese, vol.58, No.3., March
,1984,p.342.
17.’Wittgenstein on Following a Rule ‘,John McDowell, in Synthese op. cit.
P.348.
18.op.cit. p.356.
19.op. cit. ,p. 350.
20.When McDowell speaks of ‘direct cognitive contact’ and ‘meeting of minds’
it would be misleading to suppose that he refers to a kind of ‘intuition’.T
he expression ‘direct cognitive contact ‘ is used to highlight the aspect
that one can directly grasp the meaning of an expression ,there is no need
of interpretation for the understanding of the expression .Within a communal
framework or form of life ,one is able to know other’s understanding without
mediation of interpretation.
21.’Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’,John McDowell, op. cit. ,p.351.
Translated (View Original)

More options 14 Feb, 18:17
Wittgenstein : Chapter – IV
Is There a Form of Life ?
In the foregoing discussion we have stated that form of life is central to
the understanding of language. All important notions of language like rule,
grammar, understanding are rooted in a form of life. A question immediately
arises : what is the proof of form of life ?How does Wittgenstein know that
there is a form of life at all ? Is it a heuristic principle adopted for the
explanation of linguistic usages or is it self -evident and in need of no
justification.
This chapter is an enquiry into an area about which
Wittgenstein desists us from philosophising, . At the rock bottom where all
justifications are exhausted what is ultimately there is form of life. He
remains silent in saying anything further about the form of life. But the
philosopher’s curiosity is not satisfied with this sort of silence, he tries
to understand Wittgenstein’s intention on this issue .Some philosophers hold
that form of life is a convention, a policy, an arbitrary decision among
members of a community, hence, a heuristic principle adopted to the
explanation of linguistic usages. According to another group the existence
of form of life is to be proved by an indirect proof, by a transcendental
argument while others give a biological explanation of form of life.
All interpreters
, no doubt , have given a cogent and consistent explanation of form of life
on the basis of textual evidence. But none of these interpretations seem
acceptable to me .My observation is that form of life is not introduced as a
heuristic principle, nor can its existence be demonstrated by an indirect
proof, nor then can a biological explanation suffice. I shall argue that
though form of life is a precondition for all justification (this point has
already been argued) no justification can be provided for it. The reason why
I am going to support this explanation will be elaborated in course of my
discussion.
Communication requires shared understanding. This
requirement is fulfilled if there is something common to language. A
philosopher, therefore ,examines the common element of language. The
traditional view is that the mental processes which occur in the mind of the
speaker are reciprocated in the hearer on hearing a sentence. This means
that communication takes place due to the existence of a common mental
process. In order to substantiate this claim one has to fall back on a
considerable amount of theoretical presuppositions; e.g. there are
universally shared essences or mental processes. Wittgenstein realizes the
difficulty of accepting this explanation of communication and tries to
explain communication by totally sidetracking all mentalistic theories or
any theory for that matter. He sees that all the problems regarding
communication explanation created by traditional philosophers rest on
misconceptions, problems cannot really be solved by formulating
philosophical theory they are to be understood with reference to use alone.
The speaker’s understanding is known by the hearer from the speaker’s use of
a sentence. The uptake of a sentence depends on the grasping of rules being
employed by the speaker .
Wittgenstein’s strategy might seem confusing. One can argue
that Wittgenstein cannot explain communication because it is not by virtue
of grasping rules that one understands language. Wittgenstein does not speak
of rule following in the sense of employing definite rules as we find in a
deductive proof. In communication one directly understands expressions
through their use. His point is that our communication takes place not by
virtue of pre given rules but by our common practices which in a sense are a
mode of rule following.
For Wittgenstein language relates to our way of living. When
we are speaking of rules, we are speaking of rules of a language game.
Language rules are formulations of established practices with words, they do
not come from anything more fundamental. One accepts rules in learning to
speak, to use words in certain ways. Language, therefore, as a phenomenon
involves innumerable conventions. Language has an enormous number of
conventions and these help us to communicate through language. By accepting
the role of convention Wittgenstein does not imply that communication is
illusory. He is merely drawing our attention to the point that pre given
something cannot be the source of necessity. According to Wittgenstein,
there is a constraint in language and the constraint engendered by a
communal set up ;what Wittgenstein is trying to describe is the source of
necessity.
For Wittgenstein, language is related with our way of
living. Nobody can reach at foundational, context free rules. So, when he is
rejecting absolute necessity he is concerned with combating commonly
accepted views of necessity not necessity per se. Dilman correctly notices
this point which he expresses in the following passage :
‘Wittgenstein denies that there is anything of this kind (necessity),
whether up in a heaven ,or world of purely intelligible forms (Plato), in
the structure of the understanding (Kant) or within the impure forms of our
propositions (Tractatus),to force our hand or our thoughts.’1
We are guided by norms and count certain propositions as
necessary. But the norms that we follow arise through interaction with the
group of people within a certain community .This shows that Wittgenstein
accommodates the role of convention and the role of necessity at the same
time .By using the term convention he simply denies the possibility of
formal language where language is described as a system of signs governed by
explicit rules and acknowledges the actual responses that play a part in the
understanding of language. According to Wittgenstein, we are given a
sentence within a community and find it natural to use an expression in the
ways we do.
Putnum explains Wittgenstein’s notion of convention as ‘ways
of “going on” that are natural to us, given the “forms of life” that we have
inherited are prior to and presupposed by everything that could be
called “convention”
‘2.We are born within a form of life and within the given form of life ways
of ‘going on’ that we pursue appear natural to us. Thus, Wittgenstein
provides a novel exposition of necessity and convention when he refers to
convention he does not deny necessity ; he actually forwards an alternative
account of necessity (an account which has revolutionized philosophy).Again
,he rejects a priori necessity but not necessity itself the source of
necessity is relocated by him in a communal practice.
By employing ‘communal practice’ Wittgenstein emphasises the
fact that one cannot ‘internally’ obey the rule, understanding need not be
associated with an inner mental process. Obeying a rule ‘shows’ or displays
itself in practice. Rule following is a practice embedded in the customs and
agreements of a community and as such must be a form of public practice.
Communal practice, therefore, rests on an agreement, the agreement here is
not of opinion but agreement in a form of life. The agreement in a form of
life is necessary for communication i.e. there must be agreement in how
words are applied to things within a community.
This shows that agreement in a form of life is necessary for
the understanding of language. There is a shared form of life by virtue of
which one can successfully communicate. One may raise a question at this
point: How does Wittgenstein know that there is a widely shared form of
life? Is it a phenomenological assertion or can it be established in some
specific way? Wittgenstein himself has not clearly answered this question.
Commentators, therefore, try to extrapolate Wittgenstein’s view on this
subject.
So far I have tried to establish the connection between the
form of life and linguistic usages but nothing has been said so far on how
form of life itself is to be known .At the beginning of the present thesis
,I had referred to the textual occurrences of ‘form of life’ to
understand Wittgenstein’s
view on that matter. The textual exegesis suggested that form of life is
all-embracing; no linguistic transaction is to be made intelligible without
reference to form of life. Now, we are shifting from the question of the
justification of usages to the question of the justifier itself. The point
that I would like to illuminate here has not been discussed by Wittgenstein
himself. He remains completely silent on this issue. But our reasoning
cannot rest at easy, it requires clarification of such question e.g. what is
the justification of acknowledging the existence of a form of life. So,
before entering into such a discussion, I would like to recapitulate
Wittgenstein’s remarks on it. Let us recapitulate the scattered remarks made
by Wittgenstein concerning the form of life. These remarks have already been
discussed in detail in the first chapter. In the passage (PI 19)
Wittgenstein says that to imagine a language words are not enough we have to
consider something more than this, i.e. a form of life. This means that all
other aspects i.e. agreements and understanding between language users must
be taken into consideration. Everything is embedded within a form of life.
Again the passage (PI 23) says that language does not emerge from some kind
of ratiocination, it emerges from direct interaction with the lived world.
So rules originate from use. When we speak of rules we speak of rules of a
language game. But this does not imply that our communication is illusory
because rules are rooted in a comprehensive form of life. Rules possess a
kind of rigidity being rooted in a form of life. The sharing of a form of
life is expressed in the application of a rule. The sharing depends on a
kind of agreement, the agreement cannot be described as an agreement in
opinion what he refers to in the passage ( PI 241). All pervasiveness of
form of life has been expressed in the next two passages (PI p.174 and
p.226) where he says that all psychological states and mathematics too are
to be understood in respect of a form of life .In the passages of On
Certainty he clarifies the nature of form of life though a hint is found
there about the justification that it is something beyond being justified or
unjustified, it is something animal’. Thus we find that Wittgenstein makes
varied remarks and assertions about form of life but nowhere does tell us
how he knows that there is a form of life.
His mode of presentation is responsible for giving rise to
such varied interpretations. He introduces a new style of writing in
philosophy ;without discussing a problem in a familiar conventional way he
just makes some remarks regarding the topic and from the scattered
remarks it is really difficult to grasp their significance. In spite of
these difficulties we have tried to grasp his view, with special reference
to ‘form of life’. Now, if we go a step further and ask for the
justification of form of life itself we confront more difficulties because
by asking such questions we are entering into the prohibited area where
philosophy starts idling.
We have seen that Wittgenstein nowhere has referred to this
issue not only that he forbids us from making such an investigation.
According to Wittgenstein a philosopher should not go beyond use to say
something philosophical .A passage taken from the Investigations reflects
Wittgenstein’s intention :’ Philosophy simply puts everything before us
,and neither explains nor deduces anything –Since everything lies open to
view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden , is of no interest to
us’ (PI 126). It has been pointed out in our earlier discussion what is
ultimately left is form of life. It is something given, the existence of
which cannot be questioned, in Wittgenstein’s own terminology, what has to
be accepted the given is a form of life.
Form of life is the notion which Wittgenstein appeals to
whenever our explanations are exhausted and reach an end. This is the point
at which other philosophers seek to give ultimate explanations. But for
Wittgenstein the Philosophers’ attempted ultimate explanations rest on a
misconception. Problems are to be solved not by giving new information but
by arranging what we have always known. For him, if any one continues the
process of asking for explanation either he will fall back on infinite
regress or he must go beyond use. None of these alternatives seem to suffice
for Wittgenstein. He holds that when all justifications are exhausted one
reaches bedrock; if at the bedrock one tries to give an explanation one is
going beyond use and thereby engaging in a futile exercise.
But the philosophers; quest is not satisfied with this sort
of answer. They persist and continue their quest. They try to construct
plausible explanations of how form of life could be established. In other
words, how did Wittgenstein discover that there is a form of life? If at
the rock bottom there is no objective support but simply use one can
interpret expressions as one wishes. A philosopher like Kripke, therefore,
is tempted to give a sceptical interpretation of form of life. According to
Kripke, as we have already examined, there is nothing to which my use of
expressions correspond. An individual in isolation cannot determine meaning.
He depends on the community, community attributes meaning to an expression
and so long as the individual agrees with the standard laid down by the
community he understands expressions in the same way. Form of life,
therefore, is an arbitrary conformity among members of a community and it is
introduced for the solution to the sceptical problem.
I do not think that Wittgenstein puts forth a sceptical
interpretation of form of life where our communication cannot be guaranteed.
The problem of scepticism is, no doubt interesting but Wittgenstein is not
addressing this question here. Throughout his life-time he struggles to
refute scepticism. Therefore it seems unlikely that he will be inclined to
give such an interpretation. Scepticism, according to him, is not only
refutable but obvious non-sense if it tries to doubt where no question may
be asked. To disprove the claim of scepticism he dedicated his book On
Certainty where all of his efforts were directed towards establishing the
existence of certain things as unquestionable in the sense that their denial
would imply the impossibility of linguistic transactions.
What emerges from the consideration above is that all linguistic
transactions must take place within a certain ground to which no question is
to be raised. The aim of Wittgenstein was not to doubt the possibility of
communication. So, when the people obey rules they themselves do not decide
the norms. They obey the standard which is already given within the
community. It is a form of life within which they successfully communicate.
Thus we find that though Kripke has offered a sceptical
interpretation of form of life (i.e., the set of responses in which we agree
and the way they are connected with our activities is form of life) we have
surmised that his interpretation cannot be attributed to Wittgenstein’s
position. Form of life, in Wittgenstein’s philosophy is something given, it
provides a framework which is exemplified in and through communication.
There are two types of questions, some are raised and answered from within
the framework whereas some questions are there which are raised about the
framework itself. Sceptic’s challenge was not directed to the former. So
long as an individual agrees in his responses with the responses produced by
the members of the community he can communicate with the others and his
responses are counted to be correct or incorrect in the light of established
standards of the community. Thus, it is found that if the use of the
expression corresponds to the standards given by the community there is no
hindrance in communication. When sceptics ask about the use of expressions
they actually raise questions about the framework itself.
Since to ask whether there is a form of life is to ask a question about the
framework itself some are inclined to explain the framework by describing it
as a matter of decision. Such an approach to the form of life occurs in
Wright’s interpretation. On Wright’s observation, since there is no
investigation independent fact which would answer the meanings of
expressions the issue cannot be settled by accumulating evidence. So, the
possibility of conceiving alternative hypothesis for the use of expressions
remains open to us. Understanding an expression becomes a kind of ‘cottoning
on’ a leap, an inspired guess at the pattern of application. An individual
formulates a hypothesis to know the meaning of an expression and if his
understanding conforms to the standard of the community he is correct in
understanding the same. The correctness, is ascertained by the community,
but for the community there is no standard to meet. So, on Wrihgt’s
interpretation form of life is a policy that we have adopted or a convention
with which we comply. Now, if this interpretation is allowed to stand it is
possible for us to find the world and our experience intelligible in other
terms. But Wittgenstein’s inclination was not to uphold such an
interpretation. Language is grounded on something which imposes stability to
our understanding of language. Form of life, in Wittgenstein’s philosophy is
not introduced to give a causal explanation of usages, it confers guarantee
in usages. So the framework of which he is speaking cannot be subjective.
Form of life provides a framework and we communicate within this framework.
The framework is objective.
In order to explain guaranteed communication some philosophers think that
Wittgenstein has employed a transcendental argument. We have seen that form
of life justifies our linguistic usage. Some scholars claim that the
existence of a form of life is to be established by the employment of a
transcendental argument. This argument is concerned with the specification
of conceptually necessary conditions of the possibility of experience. Kant
widely uses this argument to establish necessary conditions of experience
and thereby answers the challenge of the sceptic .According to Kant, if x
constitutes a necessary condition for the possibility of y, then if y is
possible x must exist. The existence of x cannot be proved empirically, all
experiences are instead instantiated within it. So, we have to transcend the
experience of x to establish the existence of x. The distinguishing feature
of this argument is that it tries to solve problems arising out of
experience but cannot be solved within the domain of experience. The
argument, therefore, proceeds by establishing experience itself, the kind of
experience which is recognised by all and everybody. So, the experience
cannot be challenged by the sceptics without rendering their position
untenable. The experience cannot be justified by collecting empirical data.
There is a need of transcending the experience to establish that such and
such must exist. This is the fact that we communicate with each other. That
we communicate is not only the experience of someone but known to all and
everyone. If the question is raised : How do we do it ? Some commentators
answer that we must share a form of life. As Baker says, ‘The idea of a form
of life emerges as a result of a kind of transcendental argument : we have
language that we use to communicate; we could have no such language if the
locus of meaning were the individual or any facts concerning individuals.
Therefore, meaning requires a community. Form of life is Wittgenstein’s way
of designating what it is about a community that makes possible meaning.’3
Everything that we say must be in a form of life, the intelligibility of our
usages presupposes that there is an agreement in a form of life. Form of
life provides a limitation on what can intelligibly be said , we cannot go
outside the limit to tell what form of life is. We are situated within the
form of life and can successfully communicate with the help of it. From this
discussion it is evident that if form of life is established by a
transcendental argument the problem relating to scepticism regarding
communication is resolved since the transcendental argument ascertained the
necessary conditions of experience. But the argument is not accepted by all,
the conclusion which it produces appears unique only to those who believe in
this type of argument. Wittgenstein also nowhere refers to this argument.
Some scholars try to extrapolate the interpretation that form of life may be
justified by using a transcendental argument. So, whether the conclusion
would be acceptable to Wittgenstein remains under-determined. Moreover, the
establishing of form of life by transcendental argument does not seem to
suit the Wittgensteinian spirit. Wittgenstein’s inclination was not to seek
an explanation of what is given. Form of life, according to him, is given,
we can only give a description of it. When all justifications are exhausted
and the spade is turned there is no necessity of seeking for further
fundamental explanation or justification. We just pass from explanation to
description.
Secondly, according to the transcendental argument there is a force of
necessity in the conclusion which it produces. But there is no such
necessity in a form of life. Form of life imposes a kind of constraint while
accommodating change. Form of life changes if history changes. The bedrock
metaphor is not advanced to suggest that we have reached a firm a priori
foundation, it suggests only that there is nothing left to dig. So, there
cannot be a priori necessity. When transcendental argument refers to
necessity it refers to a priori necessity but Wittgenstein does not admit a
priori necessity. Wittgenstein, in fact, is searching for the commonality of
use which he finds in a form of life. He was not at all inclined to uphold
such a form of essentialism.
There is another alternative account of form of life where some philosophers
give a biological explanation. According to this view, we are so
biologically constituted that we cannot but respond in a common way,
biological history of man is the basic genesis of form of life. This
approach ‘lays greater emphasis on the biological component of the matrix
that constitutes our form of life. Man’s biological history is the most
powerful component of what Wittgenstein calls man’s ‘natural history’ which
includes, in addition , his socio-cultural history’.4 This interpretation is
supported by genetic psychology and comparative physiology. If we consider
form of life as basic it does not mean that there is a fixed and absolute
rock-bottom that constitutes our form of life. The view illuminates that the
absence of a fixed form of life does not imply the illusoriness of objective
truth nor does it imply the impossibility of communication. Every human
culture has a common bio- evolutionary history due to which our
communication becomes possible. Such a reading of later Wittgenstein is
found in T. K. Sarkar’s book : Knowledge Truth &Justification. As Sarkar
say’s ‘If the notion of a form of life is broad based enough to encompass
the bio-evolutionary aspect, starting from its primitive undifferentiated
stage, and progressing gradually to form more and more differentiated but
holistic socio-cultural matrices built on the biological substratum then . .
.neither is the possibility of cross-cultural understanding threatened nor
does conceptual relativism imply the denial of objectivity. . .’5
The above exposition correctly points out that in the absence of a
foundational something communication becomes illusory. But as soon as we
assert biological elements as basic we are admitting that they must be
present before application i.e. we are ascribing necessary conditions of
form of life which in fact is not possible in Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy. We have seen that no identity conditions for form of life are to
be attributed we can only describe it. Form of life is embodied in the use
itself and we just describe it. Wittgenstein opposes the attempt of
capturing foundation by the help of explanations. Foundation is already
there, justification therefore, need not be given about form of life- this
is corroborated by Wittgenstein’s own remarks. He says, ‘Philosophy may in
no way interfere with the actual usage of language, it can in the end only
describe it.’
For it cannot, give it any foundation either.’[PI 124]
This view makes room both for biological components and socio-cultural
inputs so as to establish commonality in linguistic practice and to show the
influence of history on language. By introducing the notion of form of life
Wittgenstein explains the fixity of rules which is essential for successful
communication but he does not thereby give an explanation of form of life
itself. Form of life cannot be explained, it can only be described. In order
to explain foundational aspects Sarkar lays stress on the biological
component and to explain the aspect of use he attends to the socio-cultural
aspect. To some extent his explanation fits in with Wittgenstein’s spirit.
Wittgenstein speaks of ‘natural history’ ,’style of living’; use of such
expressions leads him to suppose the biological elements as basic .Again,
socio-cultural component also plays a part in the understanding of language.
Both of these facets are nicely assimilated on this explanation. But we have
repeatedly said that Wittgenstein rejects any attempted explanation of
practice. He simply speaks about what we do in the end.
What emerges from the above discussion is that the role of form of life is
acknowledged in each explanation and an explanation about form of life is
given for the clarification of what it is. Though Wittgenstein does not make
any positive assertion commentators try to formulate a positive answer on
the basis of textual evidence. Kripke was surely right in thinking that if
use is the determinant of our understanding expressions how could we explain
determinate use of expressions. And scepticism originates as a result.
Kripke’s reading corresponds with Wittgensteinian thought upto a certain
point. He realizes the need for recognising the basis of language and
wrongly finds it in the community and defines form of life as a mere
external agreement and ultimately arrives at the conclusion that our
communication cannot be guaranteed. Though Wright does not uphold such a
position his interpretation cannot give better explanation. In his reading
the question about a form of life is a question about a framework and he
explains form of life in terms of a communal framework where no comparison
between consenus description and correct description is to be made. If
community changes its mind we shall understand expressions differently. Some
philosophers again, try to establish form of life by the help of
transcendental argument where we could explain successful communication. The
argument determines necessary conditions of our experience which are a
priori which cannot be attributed to Wittgenstinian thought. Lastly ,
biological explanation also answers how we successfully communicate by
accommodating both the core aspects of language and the element of change.
In all these explanations the aim of scholars was to capture Wittgenstein’s
thought , but they have not succeeded in presenting Wittgenstein’s
contention. My observation is that upto a certain point their expositions
correspond with Wittgenstein’s process of reasoning but if we find them
under the whole context of the texts they cannot produce satisfactory
answers. Wittgenstein’s aim in the later writings was not to propound a
theory , he opposes our inclination of making such an attempt. Form of life,
in Wittgenstein’s philosophy is a notion which he refers to when
philosophers are inclined to give further explanation. The distinguishing
feature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is that he tells us not to seek an
explanation going beyond use. Form of life in his philosophy is not a matter
of discovery or invention.
According to Wittgenstein, when all justifications are exhausted we reach
rock bottom. He warns us not to try to dig below bedrock; even if one tries
to do the same the spade is turned around. What we can do at that point, is
to look at practice or form of life. He emphatically says, ‘our mistake is
to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a
proto- phenomeon’[PI 654].
Form of life is a proto-phenomenon presented in the network of practice. The
task of a philosopher, therefore, is to identify the practice. There is no
need of giving further explanation of the practice itself. This is clearly
manifested in the following passage of the Remarks on the Foundation of
Mathematics. He says,
The difficult thing here is not, to dig down to the ground; no, it is to
recognise the ground that lies before us as the ground.
For the ground keeps on giving us the illusory image of a greater depth, and
when we seek to reach this , we keep on finding ourselves on the old level.
Our disease is one of wanting to explain.[RFM. VI-31]
The passage expresses the turning point in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. If
anyone asks whether below bedrock there is only contingency, whether all
reasons are dropped off and one acts irrationally , Wittgenstein’s intention
is not to say so. According to him, acting without reason does not mean
acting irrationally, it means instead to act without being able to give
reasons. So there is no disorderliness below bedrock, the support is found
in the passage to use a word without justification does not mean to use it
without right’ [PI 289]. The bedrock metaphor is used to establish that
ultimately practice is there. The practice itself determines the way how
expressions are to be understood.
Philosophers fail to recognise the ground and extend arguments for the
explanation of the ground, i.e. they try to dig below bedrock. The real
discovery in philosophy, according to Wittgenstein, is one which enables one
to stop doing philosophy. Wittgenstein’s problem in the Investigations is
how mere responses (which one thought to be irrational) are to be explained
in a determinate way. The aim of Wittgenstein was to answer the problem
which he did by presenting the notion of communal practice. McDowell here
realizes Wittgenstein’s problem (which he wants to resolve) and formulates
it by putting the question : How can a response both be nothing but a blind
reaction to a situation, not an attempt to act on an interpretation but be a
case of going by a rule ? Within a community one directly understands the
meaning of expressions i.e. understanding is delinked from interpretations.
No inference is involved in the understanding of expressions, a kind of
immediacy is present there. McDowell writes, ‘. . .shared membership in a
linguistic community is not just a matter of matching in aspects of an
exterior that we present to anyone whatever , but equips us to make our
minds available to one another.’6 A linguistic community gives us a genuine
right to answer the question why we are able to use an expression in a
determinate way. Community is not bound together by an external agreement;
they are able to know other’s minds directly, i.e., they have the capacity
for a meeting of minds’.7 This is what Lear calls ‘ a community of
like-minded souls that shares perceptions of salience, routes of interests
,feelings of naturalness,etc.’8 When one understands an expression one
thereby understands the communal set up. No explanation is necessary further
to know about what form of life is. Whatever is said about form of life and
whatever is said about anything must be said within the context of a form of
life.
Form of life is not introduced by Wittgenstein to explain anything. Form of
life is not an explanatory concept; rather all explanations are
intelligible being made within a form of life. Form of life expresses itself
in our practices. It shows why we practise in a certain way rather than
another. Our practices are constrained by our ‘mindedness’( the term is used
by Lear)9, by the actual set up responses that we have agreed upon without
justification. This implies that the idea of ‘shown’ which was one of the
central thesis of the Tractatus has been incorporated to the context of
Investigations also10. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein has drawn a clear
demarcation between what can be said in language and what language itself
expresses. That which is shown cannot be said in language. The same thought
is conveyed in the Investigations where it is found that the form of life
provides conditions for justification of meaning-understanding but form of
life is inexpressible in language. It is known from the context of the use
of expressions.
What I am upholding in the present thesis by calling form of life as shown
is not an explanation. Form of life is there and we see it in practice. Even
if one characterises my approach as an explanation, i.e. by referring to
form of life as shown I am also giving a kind of explanation . To be more
precise, to philosophise about form of life is to give a kind of
explanation. My answer is that I do not transcend the practice of the
participants to say something philosophical. I am referring back to practice
itself. Form of life itself is expressed in practice and I have just pointed
out the practice. Form of life explains why we are minded as we are, why we
understand expressions in one sense rather than another. We belong to a
common form of life and due to our sharing in the form of life we are able
to grasp expressions in a definite way.
The end.
Footnotes.
Chapter –IV
1. Quine on Ontology, Necessity and Experience, Ilham Dilman, State University
of Newyork Press Albany, 1984, p.94.
2. Putnum Hilary, Convention : a Theme in Philosophy’, in Realism and Reason
: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3, Cambridge University Press ,Cambridge, 1986.
3.’The very idea of a Form of Life’,Lynne Rudder Baker, in Inquiry, vol.27,
July 1984 , p.288.
4.Sarkar, Tushar K, Knowledge, Truth and Justification, Allied Publishers
Ltd., Jadavpur University, 1992, p.127.
5. op. cit.,p. 130.
6.’Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’, John McDowell,op. cit.,p.350.
7.The use of the expression ‘meeting of minds’ does not refer to anything
psychological, merely accessible to an individual.
8. See, Leaving the World Alone’, Jonathan Lear, op. cit. P.385.
9. See,’ Leaving the World Alone’, Jonathan Lear, op. cit.
10.I think that there is a continuity of thought between early and later
Wittgenstein though the continuity which I recognize holds in a weak sense.
Whereas in the Tractatus he holds that the form of a proposition is shown
and in the Investigations be seems to suggest that form of life is shown.